Share and Share Alike: Increasing Access to Government-Funded Inventions Under the Bayh-Dole Act by Pulsinelli, Gary
Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology 
Volume 7 Issue 2 Article 4 
2006 
Share and Share Alike: Increasing Access to Government-Funded 
Inventions Under the Bayh-Dole Act 
Gary Pulsinelli 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjlst 
Recommended Citation 
Gary Pulsinelli, Share and Share Alike: Increasing Access to Government-Funded Inventions Under the 
Bayh-Dole Act, 7 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 393 (2006). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjlst/vol7/iss2/4 
The Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology is published by the 
University of Minnesota Libraries Publishing. 
PULSINELLI_FINAL.DOC 05/11/2006 02:13:22 PM 
 
393 
Share and Share Alike: Increasing Access to 




Introduction .............................................................................. 394 
I. Background............................................................................ 397 
 A. The Bayh-Dole Act ..................................................... 397 
 1. History.................................................................. 397 
 2. Enactment and Implementation ......................... 402 
 a. Policy and Affected Parties ............................ 402 
 b. Terminology and Implementation ................. 404 
 3. The Stevenson-Wydler Act .................................. 409 
 4. Reaction and Criticism ........................................ 410 
 B. Patent Law Concerns................................................. 412 
 1. The Patent Right and Blocking Patents ............. 413 
 2. Anticommons........................................................ 415 
 3. Experimental Use ................................................ 418 
 4. Patent Pools ......................................................... 428 
II. Bayh-Dole: Prior Criticism and Proposed Solution ............ 430 
 A. The Critics: Rai and Eisenberg.................................. 430 
 B. Their Proposed Solution ............................................ 432 
 C. Critique of the Solution.............................................. 435 
III. An Alternative Proposal..................................................... 442 
 A. The Proposal............................................................... 442 
 B. Potential Impact......................................................... 446 
 1. Potential Impact on Patent Incentives ............... 446 
 2. Experimental Use ................................................ 458 
 3. Patent Pools ......................................................... 459 
 C. Practical Considerations............................................ 461 
 1. Implementation.................................................... 461 
                                                          
     ©   2006 Gary Pulsinelli. 
     *   Associate Professor, University of Tennessee College of Law, Knoxville, 
Tennessee.  A.B. Harvard University 1985; Ph.D. University of Wisconsin 
1994; J.D. University of California 1997.  The author would like to thank Doug 
Blaze, Amy Hess, Joe King, Carol Parker, and Thomas Plank for their helpful 
comments on earlier drafts of this Article. 
PULSINELLI_FINAL.DOC 05/11/2006  02:13:22 PM 
394 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 7:2 
 
 
 2. Terms of the License............................................ 468 
 a. Limitation on Rights Licensed....................... 468 
 b. Sublicensing.................................................... 470 
 c. Notice to the Patentee .................................... 470 
 d. Giving Away the Technology ......................... 471 
 3. Participation ........................................................ 473 
 D. Related Proposals ...................................................... 474 
IV. Conclusion........................................................................... 481 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1980, scientific research funded by the federal 
government was at a crossroads.  Up until that time, very little 
of this research ever generated products that benefited the 
public that had paid for the research.  Congress studied the 
problem and concluded that the culprit was, at least in part, a 
governmental policy of not patenting the inventions that arose 
from such research, or, when patents were obtained, a policy of 
refusing to license the patents on an exclusive basis.1  Without 
the protection of a patent or exclusive license, private 
companies were reluctant to proceed with the next phase—
development of saleable products—because they feared that 
once they had done the hard (and expensive) part, other 
companies would step in and free-ride on their efforts.2  In 
response, Congress passed the Bayh-Dole Act3 as a means to 
utilize the incentives of the patent system to persuade 
companies to develop inventions into products.  Under the 
Bayh-Dole Act, recipients of government funding may (subject 
to certain rights retained by the government) obtain patents on 
their inventions and then sell or license those patents as they 
see fit, including granting exclusive licenses.4 
The Act has dramatically changed the way universities 
                                                          
 1. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: 
Patents and Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. 
L. REV. 1663, 1685-87 (1996) (discussing the findings of the Commission on 
Government Procurement).  See generally id. at 1671-91 (discussing the 
history of technology transfer prior to 1980). 
 2. See id. at 1672-75, 1681-82. 
 3. Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015-28 (codified as 
amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (2000 & Supp. II 2002)). 
 4. 35 U.S.C. §§ 202-203. 
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operate and how they interact with private industry.5  
Universities and other recipients of government research 
funding have vastly expanded their patenting and licensing 
activities in an attempt to bring in revenue from patents on 
inventions developed in university laboratories.6  Most 
universities now routinely obtain and license patents, and some 
have made enormous amounts of money off their patent 
portfolios.7  Much of this revenue has come from companies, 
which now routinely monitor university research in search of 
technology that can be licensed and developed into marketable 
products.8  Thus, in many instances, the Bayh-Dole Act has had 
exactly the desired effect of generating products for the benefit 
of the public. 
However, from its inception, the Act has had its critics.  
Recently, Professors Arti Rai and Rebecca Eisenberg have 
expressed dissatisfaction with the current implementation of 
the Bayh-Dole Act.9  They assert that while some inventions 
that would otherwise have languished are now exploited 
because of the Act, other inventions that would have been 
developed anyway are now being developed under the auspices 
of the Act.10  As a consequence, these latter inventions now 
carry a “tax” in the form of a royalty that subsequent 
researchers must pay to the patent holder, and this royalty is 
then passed on to the ultimate consumer, the public.  Since 
these inventions would have been developed and used without 
the patent incentives provided by the Act, they argue, the Act 
requires that the public pay extra for something it otherwise 
would have obtained more cheaply.11  Thus, from a societal 
standpoint, patenting such inventions is undesirable. 
To solve this problem, the authors propose requiring the 
National Institutes of Health (NIH) to evaluate each grant it 
                                                          
 5. See generally, e.g., Thomas A. Massaro, Innovation, Technology 
Transfer, and Patent Policy: The University Contribution, 82 VA. L. REV. 1729, 
1731-32 (1996) (discussing the impact of Bayh-Dole on university research and 
technology transfer). 
 6. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 1708-09; Massaro, supra note 5, at 
1731-32. 
 7. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 1710-11 (giving examples of patents 
bringing large revenues to universities). 
 8. See id. at 1709. 
 9. Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the 
Progress of Biomedicine, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289 (2003). 
 10. See id. at 295. 
 11. See id. at 300-01. 
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makes and decide whether any invention (or inventions) that 
might result from the research conducted pursuant to that 
grant would or would not be further developed without a 
patent.  If the NIH concludes that any such potential 
inventions would be developed without a patent, the grant 
should prohibit the researcher from patenting them; otherwise, 
the grant should permit the researcher to patent them.12  While 
this solution is perhaps appealing in the abstract, it is 
unworkable in practice.  It suffers from difficulties both 
practical—the NIH lacks the institutional competence and 
personnel to perform such an analysis effectively—and 
fundamental—for the vast majority of inventions, nobody could 
make such a decision ex ante. 
This Article proposes an alternative reform.  Any 
researcher whose work is funded by federal funds should have 
a limited, royalty-free license to make or use, for research 
purposes on the funded project, any patent for which the 
underlying invention was developed with federal funds.  The 
license would be strictly limited to research activities, and 
would not extend to the right to sell or otherwise commercialize 
the patented invention; the patentee would retain all rights to 
commercialize the invention. 
Focusing on the user and whether he or she receives 
federal funds, rather than on the Rai and Eisenberg test aimed 
at assessing the desirability of patenting the invention, greatly 
simplifies the job of the NIH while addressing many of the 
complaints voiced by critics of the Bayh-Dole Act.  The terms of 
this license would, of course, require careful drafting to prevent 
the licensee’s overreaching into the commercial arena.  The 
license would have the further benefit of implementing a 
limited form of experimental use, and it might also serve as the 
foundation for a “patent pool” in the biotechnology industry, 
resulting in increased availability of the tools and techniques of 
the trade, whether developed with or without government 
funding. 
The following discussion focuses primarily on the NIH and 
biotechnology patents, because that is the area Rai and 
Eisenberg address in their article and is also the area with 
which I have the most familiarity.  In addition, biotechnology 
patents are currently an area of great contention, and many 
                                                          
 12. See id. at 310-11. 
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commentators advocate substantial changes with U.S. patent 
law and policy in the realm of biotechnology.  Due to its 
universal nature, however, the licensing reform that I propose 
could also be expanded to apply to other agencies and fields.  
Indeed, implementation of the proposed reform at the NIH 
might serve as a model for later adoption by other agencies. 
Part I of this Article covers the history and structure of the 
Bayh-Dole Act, as well as some basic patent law doctrines and 
concerns.  Part II examines in detail the reform proposed by 
Professors Rai and Eisenberg, highlights some of the problems, 
and concludes that it is unworkable.  Part III then explores the 
proposed new license for recipients of government funding, 
including possible ways to implement it.  It also discusses the 
potential benefits of the proposal and addresses some of its 
weaknesses. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. THE BAYH-DOLE ACT 
1. History 
The federal government has long been a major source of 
funding for scientific research, and as a consequence it has 
become the owner of many patents that resulted from this 
research.  Prior to 1980, however, almost no one ever developed 
or used most of these patented inventions.13  Statistics 
indicated that only about four percent of the patents issued 
under NASA, Department of Defense (DoD), and NIH grants 
were ever used.14  Thus, while the government was spending 
taxpayer money on research, the taxpayers were not getting 
                                                          
 13. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 1664, 1702.  The following discussion 
is derived in considerable part from Professor Eisenberg’s work. 
 14. Id. at 1702.  The four percent figure comes from the sources cited in 
note 159 therein.  See The University and Small Business Patent Procedures 
Act: Hearings on S. 414 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. 2 
(1979) [hereinafter Senate Bayh-Dole Hearings] (statement of Sen. Birch 
Bayh); id. at 28 (statement of Sen. Robert Dole); id. at 32 (statement of Sen. 
Orrin G. Hatch); id. at 46 (testimony of Elmer B. Staats, Comptroller General 
of the United States) (citing FEDERAL COUNCIL ON SCIENCE & TECH., REPORT 
ON GOVERNMENT PATENT POLICY, 1973-76 (1978)).  Professor Eisenberg notes 
that these statistics are open to challenge.  See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 
1702-03.  However, the basic premise—that many government-funded 
inventions were not getting out of the lab—is generally accepted. 
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useful products in return.15  Desiring to increase the return on 
federal investments in research, Congress began looking for 
ways to get these taxpayer-funded inventions developed into 
commercial products.16 
The first step in designing such a reform was to figure out 
why the development rate was so low.  The problem traced its 
roots, at least in part, to a split within and among the various 
agencies (and commentators observing the agencies) between 
two competing views and practices on the proper policy for the 
patenting of federal research: the license policy or the title 
policy.17 
For agencies practicing the license policy, the government 
kept only a license to use technology developed with federal 
funds, for its own use; title resided with the funding recipient 
who actually performed the research.18  Advocates of this policy 
argued that it gave funding recipients the necessary incentive 
to bid on government contracts and then to proceed to develop 
the inventions made under them.  Licensing policy advocates 
believed that if title in these inventions rested with the 
government and it granted only nonexclusive licenses, firms 
would be unwilling to take such licenses.19  These firms would 
worry that their competitors would wait for them to develop the 
markets and work out kinks in the technology, and then steal 
their markets by getting similar licenses from the government.  
Since these later competitors would avoid the startup costs, 
they would then undercut the original firm, destroying 
profitability.20 
For agencies practicing the title policy, the government 
retained full title to inventions developed with government 
funding and thus owned all resulting patents.21  Advocates of 
this policy believed that the public had an equitable claim to 
the research for which it paid, and therefore the government 
should protect the public by retaining title in the technology, 
                                                          
 15. Another impetus behind the Bayh-Dole Act was concern that 
innovating American firms frequently lost out to foreign competitors.  See 
Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 1665. 
 16. See, e.g., Senate Bayh-Dole Hearings, supra note 14, at 3 (statement of 
Sen. Birch Bayh). 
 17. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 1674-75. 
 18. See id. at 1674. 
 19. See id. at 1674-75. 
 20. See id. at 1673. 
 21. See id. at 1674. 
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either dedicating it to the public domain or granting 
nonexclusive licenses.22  Otherwise, the government would be 
inappropriately involved in selecting licensees, policing 
licensees, and policing infringement.23  If nonexclusive licenses 
turned out to be insufficient to get the product developed by the 
private sector, then the government should step in and finance 
the necessary further development itself, on behalf of the 
public.24 
Historically, Congress did not set forth uniform policy on 
this issue, and so for many years different agencies took 
different approaches to handling patents arising out of funded 
research, generally following one or the other of the two 
described policies.25  Indeed, one of the stated purposes for the 
adoption of the Bayh-Dole Act was to create a uniform policy to 
replace the twenty-six separate variations of the licensing and 
title policies then in effect for the various funding agencies.26 
Earlier, in 1963, President Kennedy had issued a 
presidential memorandum that attempted to set a more 
general policy somewhere in between the title and licensing 
policies, recognizing the advantages and disadvantages of 
each.27  The memorandum provided guidelines for determining 
when the government should retain title, but it ultimately left 
agencies with considerable discretion.28 
One important outcome of the memorandum was that it 
led, indirectly, to a detailed study of the issue by Harbridge 
House.29  The Harbridge House study found low usage rates of 
inventions made with government funding, particularly when 
                                                          
 22. See id. at 1673-74. 
 23. See id. at 1673. 
 24. See id. at 1673-74.  Professor Eisenberg points out the interesting fact 
that almost no one considered a policy of not getting patents at all and simply 
publishing to prevent others from subsequently obtaining patents.  She gives 
some practical reasons why patenting might be more effective, but it is still 
interesting that this option was not even discussed.  See id. at 1675-76. 
 25. See generally id. at 1671-95. 
 26. See Senate Bayh-Dole Hearings, supra note 14, at 2 (statement of Sen. 
Birch Bayh); id. at 30 (statement of Sen. Robert Dole) (citing Bradley Graham, 
Patent Bill Seeks Shift to Bolster Innovation, WASH. POST, Apr. 8, 1979); id. at 
33 (statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch). 
 27. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 1677-79 (citing Memorandum and 
Statement of Government Patent Policy, 28 Fed. Reg. 10,943 (Oct. 10, 1963)). 
 28. See id. 
 29. See id. at 1679-82 (citing 1 HARBRIDGE HOUSE, GOVERNMENT PATENT 
POLICY STUDY, FINAL REPORT FOR THE FCST COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT 
PATENT POLICY, at ii (1968)). 
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the government held title.30  The report ultimately concluded, 
however, that its data could not resolve the debate, and that 
the preferable policy depended on the invention in question—
that is, some inventions would only be developed into useful 
products if the government held title, while other inventions 
would be unlikely to be developed if the government held title.31 
In 1971, President Nixon issued a subsequent presidential 
memorandum stating that agencies could grant more than 
minimal, nonexclusive rights where such rights were necessary 
to get the inventions developed into commercial products, thus 
endorsing the licensing policy in at least some contexts.32  
However, this memorandum raised questions regarding 
whether the agencies had the power to take such actions absent 
congressional authorization, as they arguably transferred 
property belonging to the United States, a power the 
Constitution reserves to Congress.33 
Meanwhile, in 1969, Congress established the Commission 
on Government Procurement to research licensing issues.34  
The Commission eventually issued its report in 1972.  The 
Commission’s final report deferred to the intervening 1971 
presidential memorandum so that empirical data resulting 
from the memorandum’s implementation could inform future 
policy decisions.35  However, the Commission also suggested an 
alternative approach: Congress should replace all existing 
relevant statutes with a uniform government policy that would 
generally leave title in the hands of funding recipients, subject 
to strengthened government “march-in” rights.36  This policy 
would also have two exceptions: The government should retain 
title to inventions that it planned to develop to completion, and 
                                                          
 30. See id. at 1680. 
 31. See id. at 1681-82. 
 32. See id. at 1684-89 (citing Memorandum and Statement of Government 
Patent Policy, 36 Fed. Reg. 16,887 (Aug. 26, 1971)). 
 33. See id. at 1687-88. 
 34. See id. at 1685-87. 
 35. See id. at 1685-86. 
 36. See id. at 1686-87.  March-in refers to the right of an agency to “march 
in” and force the patentee to grant third parties a license to a patent arising 
from work performed with funds provided by the agency.  See 35 U.S.C. § 203 
(2000 & Supp. II 2002).  An agency may march in only under very specific 
circumstances, such as when the patentee is not developing the invention or 
cannot meet the demand for a patented technology that is important for health 
or safety.  Id. § 203(a)(1), (2).  March-in is discussed in more detail infra notes  
93-95 and accompanying text. 
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educational and nonprofit institutions generally would not 
receive title.37 
Finally, in 1979, President Carter, in the context of his 
Domestic Policy Review on Industrial Innovation, investigated 
the situation and indicated support for a policy of getting title 
out of the hands of the government and into the hands of 
funding recipients.38 
By and large, the title policy prevailed before 1980.  The 
general aim of the agencies was to achieve widespread 
dissemination of the results obtained in laboratories operating 
with federal money and to encourage wide development and 
usage through dedication to the public domain and 
nonexclusive licenses. 
Universities, however, became increasingly frustrated over 
changes in the ways in which the Department of Health, 
Education and Welfare (HEW), now the Department of Health 
and Human Services, and the DoD handled patent rights.39  
Beginning in the 1960s, the HEW rule was to let universities 
retain patent rights as long as they had an approved technology 
transfer system in place, and to allow them to grant exclusive 
rights to industry under Institutional Patent Agreements 
(IPAs).40  These generalized requirements obviated the need for 
case-by-case waivers for each invention, which pleased the 
universities.41  Then in 1978, HEW’s general counsel 
recommended rethinking IPAs, as they limited the agency’s 
control over the availability and cost of HEW-sponsored 
inventions.  At the same time, HEW began taking longer to 
review individual requests for patent rights.  This change in 
policy created concern that HEW was reverting to older policies 
and led to pressure for legislation to make the existing 
arrangements permanent and non-discretionary.42 
Meanwhile, DoD generally allowed funding recipients to 
retain title as long as they had “an established commercial 
position in the field.”43  This worked well for industry funding 
recipients, but it created a problem for universities, which had 
no such positions and therefore had to seek approval for each 
                                                          
 37. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 1687. 
 38. See id. at 1689-91. 
 39. See id. at 1691-93. 
 40. See id. at 1692-93. 
 41. See id. at 1692. 
 42. See id. at 1692. 
 43. See id. at 1692. 
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invention.  Many universities worked around this problem by 
taking advantage of a general “special situations” exception 
that allowed them to retain title without the need for 
individualized approval.44  However, in 1975, DoD revised its 
regulations to eliminate this exception.  Under the revised 
regulations, universities needed to show an established 
technology transfer program in the field of the invention, not 
merely an approved patent policy as previously required.  The 
change led to an eighty percent increase in deferred, case-by-
case determinations of whether the university was permitted to 
take title or whether title should remain with the agency.45  
Although these determinations were generally resolved in the 
universities’ favor, they were time-consuming, and the 
universities found the bureaucratic burden frustrating.46 
2. Enactment and Implementation 
Congress pulled all these varying threads together in 1980, 
enacting two pieces of legislation aimed at increasing 
development of federal research into private sector products: 
the Bayh-Dole Act and the Stevenson-Wydler Technology 
Innovation Act.47 
a. Policy and Affected Parties 
The Bayh-Dole Act focuses on small businesses and 
nonprofit entities receiving federal funding, such as 
universities and research foundations.48  The Act as passed was 
silent as to large funding recipients,49 who would continue 
                                                          
 44. See id. at 1692-93. 
 45. See id. at 1693. 
 46. See id. 
 47. The Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act is discussed infra 
Part I.A.3. 
 48. Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015-28 (codified as 
amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (2000 & Supp. II 2002)). 
 49. “Large” in this context refers to the residual category of funding 
recipients that fit neither the definition of “small business firm,” 35 U.S.C. 
§ 201(h), nor the definition of “nonprofit organization,” id. § 201(i).  The 
definition of “small business firm” refers to 15 U.S.C. § 632, which states: “For 
the purposes of this chapter [that is, 15 U.S.C. ch. 14A—Aid to Small 
Business, which, inter alia, establishes the Small Business Administration], a 
small-business concern . . . shall be deemed to be one which is independently 
owned and operated and which is not dominant in its field of operation.”  15 
U.S.C.A. § 632(a)(1) (1997 & Supp. 2005), referenced in 35 U.S.C. § 201(h).  
The Bayh-Dole definition further incorporates the “implementing regulations 
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under the existing regime of agency-by-agency determination.50  
The Act encourages small businesses and nonprofit funding 
recipients to patent the results of government-sponsored 
research by allowing them to retain title to the inventions if 
they diligently file patent applications and promote commercial 
development of the inventions.51  The Act also clarifies the 
authority of federal agencies to hold patents and license them 
on an exclusive or nonexclusive basis.52 
Not surprisingly, universities and small businesses 
supported the Act and its clarification of their right to retain 
title.53  Large businesses would have preferred to have been 
included; indeed, the Carter Administration had wanted to 
make the Act more comprehensive, but failed to do so.54  
However, large businesses were no worse off as they were still 
able to obtain title via individualized agency determinations, 
and therefore they did little more than grumble over their 
exclusion from the Act.55  This differential treatment was 
ultimately eliminated in 1983, when President Reagan issued a 
memorandum extending Bayh-Dole to large businesses.56  This 
extension was later quietly endorsed by Congress as part of a 
housekeeping provision in 1984.57 
Since its passage, the scope of the Bayh-Dole Act has 
gradually expanded.  As the Act now stands, almost any party 
involved in creating an invention that wants to obtain a patent 
on it can prevail over any party that does not want the 
invention to be patented.58  The funding recipient gets priority 
in electing to retain title in the subject invention.59  If the 
recipient declines, the sponsoring agency may receive title to 
the invention.60  If neither of these parties seeks to patent the 
                                                          
of the Administrator of the Small Business Administration.”  35 U.S.C. 
§ 201(h). 
 50. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 1691. 
 51. See 35 U.S.C. § 202. 
 52. See id. §§ 207-209. 
 53. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 1693. 
 54. See id. at 1693-94. 
 55. See id. 
 56. See id. at 1694-95 (citing Memorandum to the Heads of Executive 
Departments and Agencies: Government Patent Policy, 1 PUB. PAPERS 248 
(Feb. 18, 1983)). 
 57. See id. at 1694-95, 1704 n.168 (citing Trademark Clarification Act of 
1984, § 501(13), 35 U.S.C. § 210(c) (1994)). 
 58. See id. at 1666. 
 59. See id. at 1666 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(2) (1994)). 
 60. See id. 
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invention, the opportunity falls to the individual inventor.61 
In essence, the Bayh-Dole Act expresses a strong 
preference for allowing funding recipients (or, if the recipients 
are not interested, individual inventors) to retain rights in 
inventions created with federal funding.62  The policy and 
objectives of the Act are to maximize the return on federal 
research dollars by getting inventions made with government 
funding into the hands of those who will develop them—
preferably small businesses located in the United States—for 
the benefit of the public in general.63  However, the government 
should retain sufficient rights to serve its own needs and 
protect the investment of the public in the inventions.64  The 
rights are therefore subject to certain limited exceptions: denial 
of such rights in very limited “exceptional circumstances,”65 the 
government’s retention of a license to use (or have used on its 
behalf) any government-funded invention,66 and a very limited 
agency march-in right.67 
b. Terminology and Implementation 
The Bayh-Dole Act and its implementing regulations use 
the broad term “funding agreement” to mean “any contract, 
grant, or cooperative agreement entered into between any 
Federal agency . . . and any contractor for the performance of 
experimental, developmental, or research work funded in whole 
                                                          
 61. See id. (citing 35 U.S.C. § 202(d)).  Actually, the statutes are slightly 
ambiguous on the order of precedence when the funding recipient declines to 
patent.  Section 202(c)(2) states “the Federal Government may receive title to 
any subject invention in which the contractor does not elect to retain rights or 
fails to elect rights within [the statutory] times.”  35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(2) (2000 & 
Supp. II 2002).  Section 202(d) states “[i]f a contractor does not elect to retain 
title to a subject invention in cases subject to this section, the Federal agency 
may consider and after consultation with the contractor grant requests for 
retention of rights by the inventor subject to the provisions of this Act and 
regulations promulgated hereunder.” Id. § 202(d).  Thus, the statutes seem to 
give both parties the opportunity to patent.  However, given that the statute 
gives the Federal agency the authority to approve the inventor’s request, it 
could presumably deny the request on the grounds that the agency elected to 
patent the invention itself. 
 62. See 35 U.S.C. § 202(a), (d). 
 63. See id. § 200. 
 64. See id. 
 65. See id. § 202(a)(ii). 
 66. See id. § 202(c)(4). 
 67. See id. § 203. 
PULSINELLI_FINAL.DOC 05/11/2006  02:13:22 PM 
2006] SHARE AND SHARE ALIKE 405 
or in part by the Federal government.”68  In the federal system, 
“contracts” and “grants” have specific technical meanings.69 
Contracts are used when the government needs a solution 
to a particular scientific or technical problem, for its own 
purposes and under its own control.70  For example, when the 
NIH wanted to create a Molecular Libraries Small Molecule 
Repository (that is, a facility that could maintain and supply a 
collection of small molecules that might be of interest to 
researchers throughout the NIH), it issued a contract 
                                                          
 68. Id. § 201(b); 37 C.F.R. § 401.2(a) (2005) (emphasis added). 
 69. The basics of the federal procurement system are set forth in 31 
U.S.C. Chapter 63.  Section 6301 states that the general purpose of this 
chapter is to clarify under what circumstances agencies should use which type 
of funding arrangement.  See 31 U.S.C. § 6301 (2000).  Section 6303 specifies: 
An executive agency shall use a procurement contract as the legal 
instrument reflecting a relationship between the United States 
Government and a State, a local government, or other recipient 
when— 
(1) the principal purpose of the instrument is to acquire (by purchase, 
lease, or barter) property or services for the direct benefit or use of the 
United States Government; or 
(2) the agency decides in a specific instance that the use of a 
procurement contract is appropriate. 
Id. § 6303.  Section 6304 specifies: 
An executive agency shall use a grant agreement as the legal 
instrument reflecting a relationship between the United States 
Government and a State, a local government, or other recipient 
when— 
(1) the principal purpose of the relationship is to transfer a thing of 
value to the State or local government or other recipient to carry out a 
public purpose of support or stimulation authorized by a law of the 
United States instead of acquiring (by purchase, lease, or barter) 
property or services for the direct benefit or use of the United States 
Government; and 
(2) substantial involvement is not expected between the executive 
agency and the State, local government, or other recipient when 
carrying out the activity contemplated in the agreement. 
Id. § 6304.  Part 35 of the Federal Acquisition Regulations (F.A.R.), which 
addresses “Research and Development Contracting,” evokes this distinction: 
Contracts shall be used only when the principal purpose is the 
acquisition of supplies or services for the direct benefit or use of the 
Federal Government.  Grants or cooperative agreements should be 
used when the principal purpose of the transaction is to stimulate or 
support research and development for another public purpose. 
48 C.F.R. § 35.003(a) (2005).  As one commentator has observed, “Few things 
are as befuddling as the parlance involved in the doling out of the federal 
largesse.”  Jerome S. Gabig, Jr., Federal Research Grants: Who Owns the 
Intellectual Property?, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 639, 640 (1986). 
 70. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 6301, 6303; see also Diane M. Sidebottom, Updating 
the Bayh-Dole Act: Keeping the Federal Government on the Cutting Edge, 30 
PUB. CONT. L.J. 225, 230-31 (2001). 
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solicitation (through the auspices of the National Institute of 
Mental Health (NIMH)).71  Similarly, the NIH (through the 
National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID)) 
issued a contract solicitation when it wanted assistance 
developing products that could operate as countermeasures 
against radiological threats.72 
Grants, on the other hand, are used when the government 
wishes to fund the scientific enterprise more broadly, rather 
than to solve a specific problem.73  Grantees are typically much 
freer to explore as they see fit, relatively free of government 
control.74  Thus, almost all extramural, investigator-initiated 
research sponsored by NIH is funded through grants.  For 
example, the NIH has used grants to fund research into novel 
ways of using retroviral vectors to make a vaccine against 
HIV75 and mechanisms for regulating gene transcription using 
novel “protein nucleic acid” molecules.76  Thus, even though 
                                                          
 71. See National Inst. of Mental Health, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., RFP No. RM-04-0001, Molecular Libraries Small Molecule Repository 
(Dec. 29, 2003), available at http://www.nimh.nih.gov/contracts/ROADMAP-
04-0001.pdf. 
 72. See National Inst. of Allergy & Infectious Disease, U.S. Dep’t of 
Health & Human Services, Solicitation No. RFP-NIH-NIAID-DAIT-05-37, 
Medical Countermeasures Against Radiological Threats: Product Development 
Support Services (April 27, 2005), available at 
http://www.niaid.nih.gov/contract/archive/RFP0537.pdf.  A list of open 
Requests for Proposals at the NIH is available at 
http://ocm.od.nih.gov/ContractOpportunity/rfps/mainpage.htm (last visited 
Feb. 5, 2006).  A similar list for the entire federal government is available at 
“FedBizOpps,” http://www.fbo.gov/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2006). 
 73. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 6301, 6304; see also Sidebottom, supra note 70, at 
231. 
 74. See Forsham v. Califano, 587 F.2d 1128, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (“In a 
grant program the federal government gets the advantage of services rendered 
by someone who is doing his own thing, his own autonomous thing.”). 
 75. See Grant No. 1R03AI044677-01, HIV/SIV Structural Gene Vectors as 




(providing the abstract for the grant). 
 76. See Grant No. 5R01GM060642-06, Controlling Gene Expression With 




(providing the abstract of the grant).  The NIH issues grants to fund almost 
any imaginable type of research relating to the life sciences.  Individual grants 
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grants are ultimately embodied in contracts in the legal sense, 
they are not considered “contracts” in the technical way that 
term is used in the Bayh-Dole Act.  Therefore, to avoid 
confusion, I will follow the Act’s convention of using the broader 
terms “funding agreement” and “federally funded research[er]” 
(or obvious variants thereof) to refer to both types of 
arrangements collectively. 
The Act defines a “subject invention” as “any invention of 
the [funding recipient] conceived or first actually reduced to 
practice in the performance of work under a funding 
agreement.”77  The Act broadly implements a policy that favors 
placing ownership of these inventions created with government 
funds in the hands of the funding recipient: “Each nonprofit 
organization or small business firm may . . . elect to retain title 
to any subject invention.”78  To obtain these rights, the funding 
recipient must make a specific election to retain rights within a 
specified timeframe79 and file patent applications prior to any 
patent bar dates.80  Should the recipient decline to exercise its 
right to patent, the agency can then either elect to patent the 
invention itself81 or grant the individual inventor’s request to 
retain rights in the invention.82  Congress placed authority to 
implement the Act in the Department of Commerce.83 
The Act also contains certain exceptions that limit the 
scope of the patent owner’s rights.  These limitations mostly 
relate to foreign contractors84 or to inventions related to 
security85 or weapons.86  In addition, a funding agreement may 
refuse to allow the retention of title “in exceptional 
circumstances when it is determined by the agency that 
                                                          
may be found in the CRISP database.  See Computer Retrieval of Information 
on Scientific Projects, http://crisp.cit.nih.gov/ (last visited April 14, 2006). 
 77. 35 U.S.C. § 201(e) (2000 & Supp. II 2002). 
 78. Id. § 202(a).  The funding recipient must comply with various 
disclosure and reporting requirements to retain rights to the invention, 
including reporting the existence of the invention to the agency, id. § 202(c)(1), 
and keeping the agency apprised of progress toward patenting, and utilizing 
the invention, id. § 202(c)(5). 
 79. See id. § 202(c)(2). 
 80. See id. § 202(c)(3). 
 81. See id. § 202(c)(2). 
 82. See id. § 202(d).  See supra note 61 for a discussion of the interaction 
between § 202(c) and § 202(d). 
 83. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 202(b)(1), 206, 207(b), 208. 
 84. See id. § 202(a)(i). 
 85. See id. § 202(a)(iii). 
 86. See id. § 202(a)(iv). 
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restriction or elimination of the right to retain title to any 
subject invention will better promote the policy and objectives 
of this chapter.”87  That is, the funding agency may, in 
“exceptional circumstances,” decide that a particular invention 
should not be patented or that the agency should retain title.  
However, the Act makes clear that any such exercise is to be 
strictly limited, with specific substantive and procedural 
requirements for any such determination,88 administrative 
oversight,89 and specific appeal rights for the funding 
recipient.90 
Under §202, the government also reserves certain rights in 
subject inventions: 
With respect to any invention in which the contractor elects rights, 
the Federal agency shall have a nonexclusive, nontransferrable [sic], 
irrevocable, paid-up license to practice or have practiced for or on 
behalf of the United States any subject invention throughout the 
world: Provided, That the funding agreement may provide for 
[certain] additional rights.91 
Thus, the government may itself practice any invention it 
funded, and it may also authorize others to practice the 
invention on its behalf.  The funding recipient must also place 
notice in any patent applications on retained inventions, 
informing the public of the government’s rights in the 
inventions.92 
Under certain circumstances and subject to certain 
procedural safeguards, the funding agency may require the 
rights holder to assign rights to another party.93  If the rights 
holder refuses, the agency may “march in” and itself grant such 
rights.94  Section 203(a)(1)-(4) permits the agency to march in if 
it determines that: the owner of the patent has not taken 
sufficient steps to put the invention into practice, the owner 
cannot meet the demand for an invention important to health 
or safety, the owner cannot meet the need for the invention as 
required by a Federal regulation, or the owner has in some way 
violated the provisions requiring a preference for United States 
                                                          
 87. Id. § 202(a)(ii). 
 88. See id. § 202(b)(1). 
 89. See id. § 202(b)(2), (3). 
 90. See id. § 202(b)(4). 
 91. Id. § 202(c)(4). 
 92. See id. § 202(c)(6). 
 93. See id. § 203(a), (b). 
 94. See id. 
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industry.95 
3. The Stevenson-Wydler Act 
Around the same time as it passed the Bayh-Dole Act, 
Congress also passed the Stevenson-Wydler Technology 
Innovation Act,96 which was a counterpart to the Bayh-Dole 
Act.  The Stevenson-Wydler Act applied to research conducted 
by the government or government actors (for example, by 
scientists at the NIH), where no outside funding recipient 
existed to take the rights and develop the inventions under the 
Bayh-Dole Act.  Thus, the government was given the role of 
acting as its own licensor.  Stevenson-Wydler directed the 
research agencies to get more involved in technology transfer 
when there was no external funding recipient, and to grant 
exclusive licenses more frequently.97 
The Stevenson-Wydler Act made technology transfer an 
explicit part of the federal research enterprise.  Under the Act, 
“[t]echnology transfer, consistent with mission responsibilities, 
is a responsibility of each laboratory science and engineering 
professional,”98 and federal agencies should “strive where 
appropriate to transfer federally owned or originated 
technology to State and local governments and to the private 
sector”99 and set aside funds to support technology transfer.100  
The Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986101 took these 
ideas a step further, allowing government-operated laboratories 
to enter into cooperative research and development agreements 
(CRADAs) with industry, in which the laboratories agree in 
advance to assign patent rights to industry.102 
The combined result of Bayh-Dole and Stevenson-Wydler is 
this: On the extramural side, Congress encourages agencies to 
forego patent rights, in favor of funding recipients who will 
either develop the technology themselves or license it to others 
                                                          
 95. See id. 
 96. Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-
480, 94 Stat. 2311 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 3701–3717 (1998 & 
Supp. 2005)). 
 97. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 1705-06. 
 98. 15 U.S.C. § 3710(a)(2). 
 99. Id. § 3710(a)(1). 
 100. See id. § 3710(b)(2). 
 101. Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-502, 100 Stat. 
1785 (1986). 
 102. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 1706.  Subsequent amendments have 
pushed further in this direction.  See id. at 1706-08. 
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to develop.  Meanwhile, on the intramural side, it encourages 
agencies to seek patents more actively so that they can license 
these patents to industry for development.103  Thus, the Acts 
employ a dual-pronged strategy to clear away government 
obstacles to patenting by funding recipients and to encourage 
individuals and institutions lacking their own development 
capacities to own and share patent rights.104 
4. Reaction and Criticism 
Many view the Bayh-Dole Act as a rousing success.105  
Patent activity by research universities and other funding 
recipients has expanded dramatically, and some of the 
resulting patents have generated enormous income for their 
institutions.106  Awareness of patents and their uses has also 
expanded, leading to both increased industry-university 
collaboration and the rise of a large number of start-up 
companies to commercialize patents licensed from 
universities.107  Thus, in many ways, the Bayh-Dole Act has 
achieved many of its goals. 
Not everyone, however, has hailed the Bayh-Dole Act as a 
success.  Many commentators still stress one of the 
“fundamental” arguments against Bayh-Dole Act—the concern 
over “double paying.”108  The Bayh-Dole Act allows for private 
ownership of patents on inventions created with public funds, 
                                                          
 103. See id. at 1708. 
 104. See id. at 1709. 
 105. See id. at 1708 (“Since its passage in 1980 the Bayh-Dole Act has been 
consistently hailed as an unqualified success in stimulating the commercial 
development of discoveries emerging from government-sponsored research in 
universities.”); Heather Hamme Ramirez, Comment, Defending the 
Privatization of Research Tools: An Examination of the “Tragedy of the 
Anticommons” in Biotechnology Research and Development, 53 EMORY L.J. 
359, 372-74 (2004) (discussing the role of Bayh-Dole in getting many 
biotechnology inventions commercialized).  See generally, e.g., Massaro, supra 
note 5 (discussing the changes and benefits Bayh-Dole has brought to 
university research). 
 106. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 1708-10; Massaro, supra note 5, at 
1731-32; Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 292, 300-01. 
 107. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 1708-09; Ramirez, supra note 105, at 
376. 
 108. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 1666.  Representative Jack Brooks was 
a major proponent of this argument in the debates surrounding the passage of 
the Bayh-Dole Act.  See H.R. REP. NO. 96-1307, pt. 1 at 29-32, (1980), reprinted 
in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6487, 6487-91 (dissenting views of Honorable Jack 
Brooks). 
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and these patents allow the patent holders to charge users 
increased prices for the protected inventions.  Because the 
public paid for the research that led to the invention in the first 
place, the argument goes, why should the public have to pay a 
second time in the form of monopoly prices on the fruits of the 
research?  The argument is a good one, with strong intuitive 
appeal.109  However, the premise underlying Bayh-Dole is that, 
prior to the Act, the public was paying for the research and 
deriving no benefit from it (at least not in the form of 
commercial products), thus wasting public funds.  Accepting 
this premise, then,110 the actual choice is between the pre-Act 
result of paying once and getting nothing, or the Act’s result of 
paying twice and getting something, in the form of commercial 
products.111  Bayh-Dole operates on the assumption that the 
latter situation is preferable. 
Other commentators have questioned the need for Bayh-
Dole at all.  According to these commentators, the purpose of 
the patent system is to give inventors the incentive to perform 
research leading to inventions.  The Bayh-Dole Act, however, 
applies only to research conducted with federal funding, which 
funding should itself provide the necessary incentive to perform 
the inventive research.  Thus, the argument goes, since the 
government funding allows the public to get the results without 
the need for the patent incentive, why should the public now 
allow the inventor to get a patent on the results?112 
However, the Bayh-Dole Act was concerned not with the 
initial incentive to perform the inventive research, but rather 
with the subsequent incentive to develop the resulting 
inventions into useful products.113  Even after an invention is 
                                                          
 109. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 1666 (noting that Bayh-Dole 
implements “a counterintuitive policy in a number of respects” and citing inter 
alia the double-paying argument). 
 110. And not everyone does.  See, e.g., id. at 1703-04 (discussing the 
argument that the patent-licensing statistics are misleading, and that 
government-funded inventions were, in fact, widely used). 
 111. There is, of course, always the choice of eliminating public funding of 
research, and thus paying only the monopoly rents on inventions from the 
private sector.  The discussion of this option is well beyond the scope of this 
Article. 
 112. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 1666-67 (presenting this as another 
reason the Bayh-Dole policy is “counterintuitive”); id. at 1668-69 (discussing 
this “standard instrumental argument for patents”). 
 113. See id. at 1669-70.  Indeed, some argue that the incentive to develop is 
the more important incentive generated by the patent system.  See generally, 
e.g., F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing 
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made, extensive further development may be required to 
convert the basic idea into a final product; indeed, development 
costs typically greatly exceed research costs.114  While the 
government may perform and fund basic research, it typically 
does not perform or fund this subsequent development 
research, preferring to leave this task to private industry.  
Absent a patent or exclusive license to a patent, or some other 
mechanism that allows recovery of these development costs, 
however, firms will be unwilling to incur such costs.  If the 
rights in government inventions are freely available to all, then 
any firm that pays to develop such an invention runs the risk 
that later competitors will jump in and undercut it, as the 
competitors would be able to charge lower prices because they 
did not incur the development costs.  The Bayh-Dole Act 
effectively gets the invention into the hands of industry, the 
more appropriate place for such product development.115 
B. PATENT LAW CONCERNS 
The Bayh-Dole Act brought an increased role for patents in 
government-funded research, but it also highlighted the 
tension between the patent system and the government-funded 
research system.  Both systems have the ultimate goal of 
advancing scientific progress and thereby benefiting society as 
a whole, but in the short run patents may sometimes interfere 
with scientific progress.  Patents conferring exclusive rights to 
basic discoveries or tools (that is, tools that are not themselves 
intended to be developed into consumer products, but that are 
nevertheless important in facilitating future research that may 
lead to such products) may obstruct further research into 
important areas, as may multiple patents covering different 
pieces of a larger research enterprise.  Various solutions have 
arisen to address some of these obstructions, including 
infringement exemptions for basic research and the sharing of 
patents in patent pools.  This Section explores some of these 
obstructions and solutions (or proposed solutions) for relieving 
these obstructions.  The proposed Bayh-Dole licensing scheme 
presented in this Article utilizes some aspects of these solutions 
to help resolve the tension created by allowing patents on 
                                                          
Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697 (2001); Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and 
Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977). 
 114. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 1669. 
 115. Id. 
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research funded by the public. 
1. The Patent Right and Blocking Patents 
A patent is a personal property right in an invention.116  
Importantly, the fundamental patent right is a negative right 
rather than a positive right.117  As U.S. statutory patent law 
makes clear, the only right conferred by a patent is the right to 
exclude another from “mak[ing], us[ing], offer[ing] to sell, or 
sell[ing] any patented invention, within the United States or 
import[ing] into the United States any patented invention”;118 a 
patent gives the patentee no positive right to do anything.  For 
example, a patent on a potential pharmaceutical does not give 
the patentee the right to sell a pharmaceutical product to the 
public; the Food & Drug Administration (FDA), not the Patent 
& Trademark Office, is the entity charged with approving 
drugs for sale, and the existence of a patent is largely 
irrelevant to the approval process.119  The patent on the 
pharmaceutical simply gives the patentee the right to prevent 
anyone else from selling that pharmaceutical.120 
Because they are personal property rights, patent rights 
may be licensed or assigned (sold) to others.121  As the patent 
right is a negative right, a patent license is in reality the 
patentee’s promise not to sue the licensee for infringement.122  
Furthermore, patent rights are divisible: “A patentee may limit 
the grant of rights awarded under a license.  A licensee could, 
for example, obtain the right to use a patented invention but 
not to sell it.”123  In addition, there are two broad categories of 
patent licenses.  An exclusive license grants all of the patent 
rights to a single licensee and requires that the patentee grant 
no further licenses, while a nonexclusive license allows the 
patentee to grant licenses to many parties.124  These attributes 
may also be combined, as in, for example, an exclusive license 
to make the patented invention or an exclusive license to all of 
                                                          
 116. See 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2000) (“Patents shall have the attributes of 
personal property.”). 
 117. See ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R. THOMAS, PRINCIPLES OF PATENT 
LAW 4 (2004). 
 118. 35 U.S.C.A. § 271(a) (2001 & Supp. 2005). 
 119. See SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 117, at 4. 
 120. See id. 
 121. See id. at 362. 
 122. See id. at 364. 
 123. Id. at 364. 
 124. See id. at 365. 
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the rights to the invention in a particular geographic region or 
commercial market.125 
The positive right/negative right distinction comes into 
play with blocking patents.126  Two patents are said to “block” 
each other when a later invention infringes an existing patent, 
but is nonetheless patentable itself.127  In such a case, neither 
patentee can practice the new invention without a license from 
the other.  For example, if A has a patent on a new drug and B 
then obtains a patent on an improved method of making that 
new drug, neither patentee can make the drug using the new 
process without infringing the other’s patent: A’s patent allows 
A to exclude B from making the patented drug by any method, 
but B’s patent allows B to exclude A from making the patented 
drug by the improved method.128  For anyone to make the drug 
by the improved method, the parties will have to work out some 
sort of licensing arrangement.129  Alternatively, different 
parties might own patents on components that need to be 
combined to make a saleable product.  Neither party can build 
the complete product without a license from the other.  For 
example, if one party owns the patent on the television tuner 
and another party owns the patent on the television tube, 
neither party will be able to build a complete television without 
a license from the other.  The parties generally resolve this 
fairly common situation by agreeing to license each other, often 
called cross-licensing. 
The negative right granted by a patent is a major strength 
of the patent system, but in some circumstances it can lead to 
problems.  The presence of multiple overlapping rights over a 
piece of technology can operate to block development of that 
technology, as no one can get sufficient rights to advance the 
technology.130  Problems also may arise when a patent on a core 
                                                          
 125. See, e.g., Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252, 255-56 (1891) 
(discussing various possible license terms). 
 126. See SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 117, at 4-5 (citing Robert P. 
Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdowns: The Case of 
Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75 (1994)).  See generally ROBERT PATRICK 
MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW & POLICY: CASES & 
MATERIALS 88-89, 392-93 (3d ed. 2002) (discussing blocking patents). 
 127. See SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 117, at 4-5 & n.3. 
 128. Cf. id. at 4-5 (using the example of a patented mousetrap and an 
improved version of the mousetrap). 
 129. See id. at 5. 
 130. This problem arose in the early days of the airplane and automobile 
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technology is used to block development of future research.131  
Various solutions have been used or proposed to address these 
issues, including an explicit legal exemption for experimental 
use and the sharing of patent rights among the members of an 
industry, both of which will be discussed below. 
2. Anticommons 
One possible ramification of the negative patent right is 
that it may create an “anticommons” that leads to underuse of 
a particular technology.  The anticommons concept has its roots 
in an influential article in Science in 1968, in which Garrett 
Hardin proposed the “tragedy of the commons.”132  According to 
this theory, “people often overuse resources they own in 
common because they have no incentive to conserve.”133  Over 
time, Hardin’s paper became “a powerful justification for 
privatizing commons property.”134  In 1998, again in Science, 
Professors Michael Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg propounded 
an inverse “tragedy of the anticommons.”135  According to this 
theory, the reverse situation may also arise: If too many people 
have rights to exclude others from a piece of property, then that 
piece of property may be underused.136  In particular, 
Professors Heller and Eisenberg propose that too many patent 
rights are being awarded in the biotechnology field, and these 
patents are interfering with the progress of research in this 
area.137 
Professors Heller and Eisenberg present their theory this 
way: 
[A] resource is prone to underuse in a “tragedy of the anticommons” 
when multiple owners each have a right to exclude others from a 
scarce resource and no one has an effective privilege of use.  In 
theory, in a world of costless transactions, people could always avoid 
commons or anticommons tragedies by trading their rights.  In 
                                                          
industries.  See Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual 
Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293, 
1342-47 (1996). 
 131. See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 126, at 393. 
 132. See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter 
Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698 
(1998) (citing Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 
1243 (1968)). 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. See id. 
 137. See id. 
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practice, however, avoiding tragedy requires overcoming transaction 
costs, strategic behaviors, and cognitive biases of participants, with 
success more likely within close-knit communities than among hostile 
strangers.  Once an anticommons emerges, collecting rights into 
usable private property is often brutal and slow.138 
The authors worry that exactly this situation is emerging 
in the biotechnology field, particularly with “upstream” basic 
research that is needed to feed “downstream” applied 
research.139  They note that changes in U.S. policy, exemplified 
by legislation such as Bayh-Dole, have led to increased 
patenting of discoveries that in the past would have been left to 
the public domain.140  Accompanying this increased patenting 
in the public sector is an increase in both the number of 
biotechnology companies and their awareness of the value of 
intellectual property rights.141  Taken together, these trends 
have led to more pieces of the biotechnology landscape being 
covered by proprietary rights, typically patent rights.142  
Because the patent right is the right to exclude, researchers in 
the biotechnology field are at risk of being excluded from 
advancing their research. 
Professors Heller and Eisenberg point to two mechanisms 
currently in place that may lead to an anticommons in 
biotechnology.  The first mechanism involves the tendency to 
give concurrent rights in potential future products.143  For 
example, the authors note that many researchers may wind up 
with patents on individual segments of a particular gene 
sequence, each patent hindering the others from doing further 
basic research on the gene as a whole.144  Similarly, a wide 
division of ownership of the various genes needed for a test to 
screen for useful pharmaceuticals might prevent any one 
researcher from collecting all the pieces needed to perform the 
screen.145 
The second mechanism involves the increased “stacking” of 
licenses.146  An increasingly common type of license to use 
                                                          
 138. Id. (endnotes omitted). 
 139. See id. 
 140. See id. 
 141. See id. 
 142. See id. 
 143. See id. at 699. 
 144. See id. 
 145. See id. 
 146. See id. 
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biotechnology research tools is the “reach-through” license, 
which requires the licensee to pay the patentee a royalty on any 
product developed using the patented technology, whether the 
patented technology appears in the final product or not.147  
When a large number of these upstream patented technologies 
are needed to create a particular saleable product, the 
aggregation of license fees may make the project economically 
untenable.148 
After concluding that these mechanisms may contribute to 
the rise of a biotechnology anticommons, the authors explore 
whether such an anticommons is likely to persist if it does 
arise.149  They cite three reasons why it might.  First, the 
transaction costs of bargaining are high, and biotechnology 
firms might not be able to bear these high costs.150  Bearing 
high costs is particularly difficult for the nonprofit entities such 
as universities that—through Bayh-Dole—hold a large number 
of the important patents.151  Furthermore, the rights involve 
such a wide variety of techniques that valuing them is difficult, 
and this uncertainty increases disputes over license terms.152  
Finally, other considerations, particularly antitrust laws, may 
stand in the way of effective bargaining.153 
Second, the diverse range of interested parties in the 
biotechnology industry will impede resolution of anticommons 
problems.154  For example, public entities (such as the NIH) 
view themselves as playing an important role in facilitating 
public health, and thus desire to spread discoveries and 
inventions widely.  Meanwhile, private entities generally will 
prefer to keep their inventions closer to home, benefiting from 
the monopoly on the resource.155  Another conflict is between 
those entities performing “upstream” basic research and those 
performing “downstream” applied research.  The latter would 
clearly prefer that the tools they need be widely available, 
while the former might prefer to maximize their return by 
                                                          
 147. See id. 
 148. See id. at 699-700. 
 149. See id. at 700-01. 
 150. See id. at 700. 
 151. See id. 
 152. See id. 
 153. See id. 
 154. See id. 
 155. See id. 
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granting limited or even exclusive licenses to the tools.156  
Differences in culture may also lead to differing perspectives on 
the propriety of enforcing and/or infringing patents.157 
Third, cognitive biases may impede bargaining.158  In 
particular, owners of upstream research tools are all likely to 
view their particular tool as the most vital to the success of the 
whole project, even though their tool is only one of many 
needed in the project, and therefore are likely to overvalue 
their own contribution.  As a consequence, they will all tend to 
demand more compensation than their contribution is worth to 
the developer.  No rational developer will be willing to pay the 
price to obtain access to all of the necessary tools.159  
Researchers may also be loathe to bargain with a scientific 
rival, even when the transaction might be economically 
advantageous for both parties.160 
In the end, Professors Heller and Eisenberg conclude that 
“[a]n anticommons in biomedical research may be more likely 
to endure than in other areas of intellectual property because of 
the high transaction costs of bargaining, heterogeneous 
interests among owners, and cognitive biases of researchers.”161  
They then finish with a few policy suggestions, recommending 
more careful use of privatization of research results, clearer 
patent limits on upstream patents, and decreased use of 
restrictive terms in licenses to upstream patents.162  
“Otherwise, more upstream rights may lead paradoxically to 
fewer useful products for improving human health.”163 
3. Experimental Use 
The common law experimental use exemption164 is an 
                                                          
 156. See id. 
 157. See id. at 700-01. 
 158. See id. at 701. 
 159. See id. 
 160. See id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. See id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. This Article uses the term “experimental use exemption” rather than 
“research exemption,” as that is the term more commonly used in the 
literature.  This usage is not to be confused with the doctrine of “experimental 
use” as applied to negating a prior public use or sale.  See, e.g., City of 
Elizabeth v. Am. Nicholson Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126 (1877) (applying the 
experimental use doctrine); see also Gregory N. Pate, Analysis of the 
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important but narrow patent law doctrine that exempts certain 
uses of patented inventions from claims of infringement.  The 
doctrine traces its roots to Justice Story’s 1813 opinion in 
Whittemore v. Cutter.165  According to Justice Story, “it could 
never have been the intention of the legislature to punish a 
man, who constructed such a machine merely for philosophical 
experiments, or for the purpose of ascertaining the sufficiency 
of the machine to produce its described effects.”166  Justice 
Story subsequently distinguished this type of use from “the 
making with an intent to use for profit, and not for the mere 
purpose of philosophical experiment, or to ascertain the verity 
and exactness of the specification.”167  As Judge Newman of the 
Federal Circuit recently noted, in 1813 when these cases were 
decided, “philosophical experiments” referred to “natural 
philosophy”—what we now call simply “science.”168  Justice 
Story’s creation rapidly evolved into an accepted defense to 
infringement, as evidenced by its inclusion in treatises from the 
late nineteenth century.169 
The experimental use exemption is premised on the idea 
that patent law is eminently a utilitarian doctrine.  As a 
consequence, pure research not directed towards profits should 
not be deemed an infringement, as it does not interfere with 
the pecuniary interests of the patentee.170  Similarly, one of the 
major purposes of the patent system is to provide an incentive 
for inventors to disclose their invention and thereby get 
                                                          
Experimental Use Exception, 3 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 253, 256 (2002) (noting that 
“[t]he ‘experimental use exception’ actually describes two entirely separate 
[patent law] doctrines”). 
 165. 29 F. Cas. 1120 (C.C.D. Mass. May 1813). 
 166. Id. at 1121. 
 167. Sawin v. Guild, 21 F. Cas. 554, 555 (C.C.D. Mass. Oct. 1813). 
 168. See Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 874-75 
n.8 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Newman, J., dissenting), vacated, 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005); 
see also Brief for Amicus Curiae Bar Association of the District of Columbia — 
Patent, Trademark & Copyright Section in Support of Neither Party at 6-8, 
Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005) (No. 03-
1237) (“Later cases show that the term ‘philosophical,’ as used in Whittemore I, 
is synonymous with the term ‘scientific.’”). 
 169. See Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 862 (Fed. 
Cir. 1984) (discussing the history of the experimental use exemption and citing 
W. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS § 898 (1890)). 
 170. And as a corollary of this view of the doctrine, research done in a 
corporate context is virtually never deemed to be eligible for the exemption.  
See Ronald D. Hantman, Experimental Use as an Exception to Patent 
Infringement, 67 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 617, 626-30 (1985) 
(collecting cases). 
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technical information into the hands of those who can make use 
of it.171  Thus, the common law experimental use exemption, as 
traditionally understood, allows for non-commercial research 
on the patented invention.172 
Commentary on the common law experimental use 
exemption has been mixed.  Some commentators believe that 
any but the most minimal exemption is entirely inappropriate 
and undermines the strength of the patent system.173  Others 
counter that the doctrine plays a crucial role in the law, 
particularly in accommodating patent law to the norms of 
science (principally the scientific norm of the free sharing of 
ideas and techniques as part of a unified endeavor), especially 
in the realm of “basic” research, and in resolving otherwise 
intractable sharing problems (such as anticommons).174 
The commentators often divide experimental use into three 
basic categories.175  The first category traces its roots back to 
                                                          
 171. See SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 117, at 12. 
 172. For a summary and discussion of some of the varying proposed 
implementations of an experimental use system, including its widespread use 
in foreign patent systems, see NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, A PATENT 
SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 108-17 (Stephen A. Merrill, Richard C. Levin 
& Mark B. Myers eds., 2004) (chapter entitled “Seven Recommendations for a 
21st-Century Patent System: Shield Some Research Uses of Patent Inventions 
from Infringement Liability”). 
 173. See generally, e.g., Richard E. Bee, Experimental Use as an Act of 
Patent Infringement, 39 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 357 (1957); Jordan P. Karp, 
Experimental Use as Patent Infringement: The Impropriety of a Broad 
Exception, 100 YALE L.J. 2169 (1991); Michael S. Mireles, An Examination of 
Patents, Licensing, Research Tools, and the Tragedy of the Anticommons in 
Biotechnology Innovation, 38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 141, 201-05, 211-16 
(2004); Ramirez, supra note 105, at 384-88. 
 174. See generally, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of 
Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017 
(1989); Hantman, supra note 170; Janice M. Mueller, No “Dilettante Affair”: 
Rethinking the Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement for 
Biomedical Research Tools, 76 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2001); Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, 
Protecting the Public Domain of Science: Has the Time for an Experimental 
Use Defense Arrived?, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 457 (2004); Katherine J. Strandburg, 
What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain, 81 WIS. 
L. REV. 81 (2004).  Cf. Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in 
Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1177 (2000) (proposing a “fair use” right for 
patent law based on the copyright fair use doctrine; the impact of this right 
would be similar to experimental use). 
 175. See FEDERAL TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER 
BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY ch. 4, at 34-37 (2003) 
[hereinafter FTC INNOVATION REPORT], available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf (discussing the three 
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Justice Story’s formulation—”for the purpose of ascertaining 
the sufficiency of the machine to produce its described 
effects”176 and “to ascertain the verity and exactness of the 
specification.”177  In other words, later researchers are allowed 
to experiment with the patented invention to make sure that it 
works as claimed and that its description in the patent 
specification complies with the patent laws.178  Without such a 
right, competitors would have no way of determining the 
validity of the patent, and the patent would be effectively 
invincible to this type of challenge.179  This aspect of 
experimental use is relatively uncontroversial and is generally 
accepted, even by those who reject a broader experimental use 
right.180 
The second category of experimental use involves research 
on the patented invention for the purpose of designing around 
it or improving upon it.181  This category is more controversial.  
For those commentators who accept experimental use in 
general, this category is their prime motivation.182  If 
                                                          
categories). 
 176. Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. Mass. May 1813). 
 177. Sawin v. Guild, 21 F. Cas. 554, 555 (C.C.D. Mass. Oct. 1813). 
 178. The patent laws require that: 
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, 
and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, 
clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the 
art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to 
make and use the same. 
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).  Failure to comply with these enablement and written 
description requirements results in the patent being invalid.  See id. § 282 
(2000) (listing as a defense to infringement “[i]nvalidity of the patent or any 
claim in suit for failure to comply with any requirement of section[] 112 . . . of 
this title”). 
 179. See Eisenberg, supra note 174, at 1074-75.  Professor Eisenberg also 
notes that such scrutiny of the results of others is important to the integrity of 
the scientific enterprise itself.  See id. at 1053-55. 
 180. See, e.g., FTC INNOVATION REPORT, supra note 175, at ch. 4, at 36 
(“Both scholarly analysis and Hearing participants favor an experimental use 
defense in the first setting.  Research to determine if or how a patented 
invention works essentially makes effective the required enablement 
disclosure.” (footnote omitted)); Karp, supra note 173, at 2176-77.  Indeed, it 
seems so accepted as to have never been challenged in court. 
 181. See FTC INNOVATION REPORT, supra note 175, at ch. 4, at 36. 
 182. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 174, at 1078 (“A patent holder should 
not be entitled to enjoin the use of a patented invention in subsequent 
research in the field of the invention, which could potentially lead to 
improvements in the patented technology or to the development of alternative 
means of achieving the same purpose.”); Hantman, supra note 170, at 639-40 
(“[A]ctivity directed to improvements and new uses for patented technology 
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subsequent researchers cannot experiment on the claimed 
invention for these purposes, the reasoning goes, what is the 
point of the detailed disclosure provisions of the Patent Act?183  
As Judge Newman recognized in her dissent in Integra 
Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA: 
The patent statute requires full disclosure of the invention, including 
details of enabling experiments and technical drawings and best 
modes and preferred embodiments, even commercial sources of 
special components.  Such details would be idle and purposeless if 
this information cannot be used for 17-20 years [that is, the length of 
the patent term]. . . .  To the contrary, the patent system both 
contemplates and facilitates research into patented subject matter, 
whether the purpose is scientific understanding or evaluation or 
comparison or improvement.  Such activities are integral to the 
advance of technology.184 
Patentees understandably oppose such a right, because 
exempting these types of uses runs directly counter to their 
economic interests—the exemption is aimed at providing 
alternatives to the patented invention.185  Supporters of the 
exemption respond that such uses are an important part of 
experimental use—indeed, as Judge Newman noted, such uses 
are fundamental to the patent system itself.  A major goal of 
the patent system is to get patented inventions into the hands 
of researchers so that they can be exploited in these ways.186  
Successful research, if the resulting product no longer infringes 
the patent, could be handled with a royalty on any commercial 
products.187 
The third and most controversial category is research tools, 
that is, tools that facilitate research into other areas.188  The 
                                                          
should fall within the experimental use exception.”). 
 183. Indeed, one commentator argues: 
[E]xperimental use aimed at understanding, designing around, or 
improving a patented invention is merely an extension of disclosure 
[as required in § 112]. . . . “Experimenting on” a patented invention 
can, and should, be broadly permitted, regardless of commercial 
intent, as a means of ensuring that the public receives the benefit of 
its patent bargain with respect to follow-on innovation. 
Strandburg, supra note 174, at 146. 
 184. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 875 (Fed. 
Cir. 2003) (Newman, J., dissenting), vacated, 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005). 
 185. See Eisenberg, supra note 174, at 1075-76 
 186. See Hantman, supra note 170, at 643. 
 187. See Eisenberg, supra note 174, at 1078-79 (suggesting such a remedy). 
 188. See id. at 1074; Integra Lifesciences, 331 F.3d at 878 (Newman, J., 
dissenting). 
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sole purpose of research tools is to facilitate subsequent 
research, and thus the only market for research tools is 
researchers.189  If researchers are exempt from infringement of 
such tools, then the patentee has no one left to exclude, and so 
cannot recoup its development costs.  Allowing experimental 
use of such tools effectively destroys any market for them, and 
therefore any incentive to develop them.190  Even the 
commentators who favor the experimental use exemption often 
exclude research tools, limiting the exemption to further 
research into the thing patented for purposes of improving on 
or designing around the patent.191  However, some recent 
commentators—particularly those concerned with 
anticommons and related problems in the biotechnology area—
advocate expanding the exemption to cover even research tools, 
at least when these tools are being unreasonably withheld and 
are not available through the anonymous market.192 
Research tools are a particularly hot topic in biotechnology.  
The NIH appointed a working group, the NIH Working Group 
on Research Tools, to study the issue.  The Working Group 
                                                          
 189. See Eisenberg, supra note 174, at 1072-74. 
 190. Id. (“An experimental use exemption seems most likely to undermine 
critical patent incentives when the researcher is an ordinary consumer of an 
invention with a primary or at least significant market among research 
users.”). 
 191. Id. (“Nor does it seem likely that a research exemption is necessary to 
ensure that scientists will have access to such an invention: the patent holder 
will see research users as potential customers rather than hostile rivals and 
will want to extend licenses to them in order to extract the full value of the 
patent monopoly.”); Hantman, supra note 170, at 639; FTC INNOVATION 
REPORT, supra note 175, at ch. 4, at 36 (“Inventors of tools used by researchers 
need an income stream from those who use their inventions. The Hearing 
record provides no basis for exempting such tools from patent protection, and 
leading scholarly commentary agrees.”); Integra Lifesciences, 331 F.3d at 878 
(Newman, J., dissenting) (“A research tool . . . is as subject to the patent right 
as is any other device or method, whether it is used to conduct research or for 
any other purpose.”). 
 192. See Mueller, supra note 174, at 58 (proposing researchers be able to 
use research tools in this situation, subject to a government-determined 
royalty); Strandburg, supra note 174, at 142-46 (proposing the same, but only 
after an initial five-year period of exclusivity).  On the other hand, arriving at 
the royalty would be difficult, particularly where multiple patents are 
infringed (as when, for example, the researcher screens a library that contains 
multiple patented DNA or protein products).  See Mueller, supra note 174, at 
63-66 (discussing the difficulties of determining the proper royalty rate, and 
stating, “The determination of appropriate [royalty] rates can be a very 
complex and expensive process”); Eisenberg, supra note 174, at 1077 
(discussing the same difficulties, for a different aspect of experimental use, 
and stating, “Determination of reasonable royalties is never an easy task”). 
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issued a report that subsequently led to a set of guidelines for 
use of such tools at the NIH.193  The report provided the 
following definition: 
We use the term “research tool” in its broadest sense to embrace the 
full range of resources that scientists use in the laboratory, while 
recognizing that from other perspectives the same resources may be 
viewed as “end products.” For our purposes, the term may thus 
include cell lines, monoclonal antibodies, reagents, animal models, 
growth factors, combinatorial chemistry libraries, drugs and drug 
targets, clones and cloning tools (such as PCR), methods, laboratory 
equipment and machines, databases and computer software.194 
Similarly, Judge Newman, in her dissent in Integra 
Lifesciences, stated: “A research tool is a product or method 
whose purpose is use in the conduct of research, whether the 
tool is an analytical balance, an assay kit, a laser device (as in 
Madey v. Duke University), or a biochemical method such as the 
PCR (polymerase chain reaction).”195  Concern over the use of 
these research tools in biotechnology has been the subject of 
extensive recent commentary and analysis.196 
However, the distinction between experimenting on the 
patented invention and using the patented invention as a tool 
for other research is not without its problems—in many cases, 
drawing the line between the two types of uses is difficult.197  
For example, a researcher may be performing research into a 
                                                          
 193. See NATIONAL INSTS. OF HEALTH, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL 
INSTITUTES OF HEALTH WORKING GROUP ON RESEARCH TOOLS (1998) 
[hereinafter NIH RESEARCH TOOLS REPORT], available at 
http://www.nih.gov/news/researchtools/; see also Principles and Guidelines for 
Recipients of NIH Research Grants and Contracts on Obtaining and 
Disseminating Biomedical Research Resources: Final Notice, 64 Fed. Reg. 
72090 (Dec. 23, 1999) [hereinafter NIH Research Tools Guidelines], available 
at http://ott.od.nih.gov/pdfs/64FR72090.pdf. 
 194. NIH RESEARCH TOOLS REPORT, supra note 193 (Background section). 
 195. Integra Lifesciences, 331 F.3d at 878 (Newman, J., dissenting) 
(footnote omitted). 
 196. See generally, e.g., NIH RESEARCH TOOLS REPORT, supra note 193; 
NIH Research Tools Guidelines, supra note 193; Mireles, supra note 173; 
Mueller, supra note 174; Ramirez, supra note 105. 
 197. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 172, at 114-15 
(“[A]lthough it may seem relatively simple to distinguish use of a patented 
invention to ‘see how it works’ or for the purpose of ‘improvement’ from use of 
a patented research tool, it may be very difficult in practice.”); Eisenberg, 
supra note 174, at 1084-86 (indirectly exploring the difficulty in making the 
distinction regarding transgenic mice); cf. Integra Lifesciences, 331 F.3d at 
878 (Newman, J., dissenting) (chiding the majority for misunderstanding the 
distinction and therefore mischaracterizing the invention of the patents in 
suit). 
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particular pharmaceutical product.  If the researcher needs 
large quantities of the pharmaceutical, he or she may be 
simultaneously refining a method for producing the 
pharmaceutical product more efficiently and using the 
resulting product in other experiments.  If a step in the 
production method is patented, is the researcher legitimately 
experimenting “on” this step (as part of the refinement 
research), or is he or she illegitimately using the step as a “tool” 
for other research (because the step is used to produce a 
product that is itself used for further research)?  In this type of 
situation, which is not uncommon, both arguments are equally 
plausible.  Thus, the necessary distinction between the two 
types of uses is not always easy to make. 
Cases involving the common law experimental use 
exemption for researchers at academic institutions have not 
actually arisen with much frequency.  The exemption has 
traditionally operated more informally, in that historically 
academic scientists have patented their inventions only rarely, 
and commercial patentees have sued academic researchers only 
rarely.198  The modern emphasis on extracting the full value 
from patents, coupled with the increase of profit-motivated 
research in universities in response to Bayh-Dole, is causing a 
shift in this behavior, and so experimental use has taken on 
more importance recently.199 
The Federal Circuit has generally viewed the common law 
experimental use exemption with grave suspicion, reading the 
exemption narrowly.  In Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar 
Pharmaceutical Co.,200 a generic drug company argued that its 
research and testing on a patented drug prior to the expiration 
of the patent, with the goal of releasing a generic equivalent of 
the drug immediately upon expiration of the patent, qualified 
for the experimental use exemption.201  The court disagreed, 
holding that this research and testing was for commercial 
purposes and was therefore an infringement of Roche’s 
patent.202  Although Congress later overruled the specific 
                                                          
 198. See FTC INNOVATION REPORT, supra note 175, at ch. 4, at 35 (“The 
strength and contours of the defense have not been fully tested; as several 
panelists testified, corporations typically have not sued universities.”). 
 199. See Dreyfuss, supra note 174, at 457-61 (exploring the reasons for this 
shift). 
 200. 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
 201. See id. at 860, 862. 
 202. See id. at 863 (“[W]e hold the experimental use exception to be truly 
narrow, and we will not expand it under the present circumstances. . . . Bolar’s 
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holding in Roche by creating a special statutory exemption for 
infringements that are “solely for uses reasonably related to the 
development and submission of information under a Federal 
law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs” 
(that is, research related to the FDA drug approval process),203 
it did not address the common law experimental use exemption 
as a general proposition.  Later, in his concurrence in Embrex, 
Inc. v. Service Engineering Corp.,204 Judge Rader stated flatly 
that the common law experimental use exemption no longer 
existed: “[N]either the statute nor any past Supreme Court 
precedent gives any reason to excuse infringement because it 
was committed with a particular purpose or intent, such as for 
scientific experimentation or idle curiosity.”205 
More recently, the Federal Circuit considered the common 
law research exemption in Madey v. Duke University.206  John 
Madey was a researcher at Duke who had a patent (granted 
before he was hired by Duke) on a laser that was useful for 
certain research applications.207  Madey subsequently left Duke 
after a series of disputes over his position,208 yet even after his 
departure, Duke continued to use his laser, without a license, 
to complete work under various government grants.209  In 
response, Madey sued Duke for patent infringement.210  As a 
defense, Duke asserted that its use was entirely experimental, 
and therefore its infringement should be excused.211  The 
Federal Circuit declined to allow the exemption.212  More 
importantly, it expressed its holding in very broad language 
that severely narrowed (if not destroyed) the exemption, taking 
“philosophical” in its narrow modern sense of esoteric inquiry 
                                                          
intended ‘experimental’ use is solely for business reasons and not for 
amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry . . . 
[and] is thus an infringement of the ’053 patent.”). 
 203. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (2000).  The Federal Circuit has also interpreted 
this exemption narrowly.  See Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 
F.3d 860, 865-68 (Fed. Cir. 2003), vacated,  125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005). 
 204. 216 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 205. Id. at 1353 (Rader, J., concurring). 
 206. 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 958 (2003). 
 207. See id. at 1352. 
 208. See id. at 1352-53. 
 209. See id. at 1353-54. 
 210. See id. at 1353. 
 211. See id. at 1360-63. 
 212. See id. at 1362-63. 
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rather than its historic sense of science generally:213 
[R]egardless of whether a particular institution or entity is engaged 
in an endeavor for commercial gain, so long as the act is in 
furtherance of the alleged infringer’s legitimate business and is not 
solely for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly 
philosophical inquiry, the act does not qualify for the very narrow and 
strictly limited experimental use defense.  Moreover, the profit or 
non-profit status of the user is not determinative.214 
Shortly after Madey, the common law exemption arose 
again in Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA.215  On its 
face, Merck involved interpretation of the statutory exemption 
for research relating to the FDA drug approval process 
contained in 35 U.S.C. §271(e), and how far back into the 
research process the exemption extended.216  Indeed, the 
majority opinion of the Federal Circuit specifically stated that 
the common law experimental use exemption was not at 
issue.217  However, Judge Newman dissented, contending that 
the §271(e) exemption extended back to the point at which the 
common law experimental use exemption ended, and thus all of 
Integra’s conduct was covered under one or the other 
exemption.218  She also used the opportunity to attack the 
broad language of Madey regarding the common law 
exemption, characterizing the breadth of the Madey holding as 
unnecessary dicta.219  In her view, Madey involved using a 
research tool for its intended purpose (that is, facilitating 
research into other areas), which should be an infringement not 
implicating the common law experimental use exemption.220  
The common law exemption should apply only to further 
research into the thing patented, for purposes of improving on 
or designing around the patent.221  Thus, Madey’s language 
attacking the foundation of the common law experimental use 
exemption was unnecessary.  The Supreme Court subsequently 
reversed the Federal Circuit’s narrow reading of the statutory 
exemption, expanding its coverage to a broader range of 
                                                          
 213. See supra note 168 and accompanying text. 
 214. Madey, 307 F.3d at 1362. 
 215. 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003), vacated, 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005). 
 216. See id. at 864-68 (concluding that the answer was “not very far”). 
 217. See id. at 863 n.2. 
 218. See id. at 872-78 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 219. See id. at 878 n.10. 
 220. See id. 
 221. See id. 
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research relating to FDA drug approval.222  However, the 
Supreme Court’s opinion did not address the scope of the 
common law research exemption.223 
Despite the Federal Circuit’s current reluctance to apply it, 
the experimental use exemption plays an important role in 
facilitating research, and so it should be implemented in at 
least a limited way. 
4. Patent Pools 
Another way to accommodate the conflicting exclusionary 
rights in a complex technology is with a patent pool.  In a 
patent pool, individual patentees assign their patents to a 
single collective entity in exchange for license to use the other 
                                                          
 222. Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372, 2383-84 
(2005). 
 223. Several commentators who favor a broad experimental use exemption 
filed amicus briefs urging the Court not to address the issue in this case.  See 
Amicus Curiae Brief of the American Intellectual Property Law Association in 
Support of Neither Party at 22-24, Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 
125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005) (No. 03-1237) (“The question presented by the 
petitioner does not implicate the scope of the common-law exception, and in 
any event the facts of this case do not raise the issue.  AIPLA therefore urges 
this Court not to consider the scope and nuances of the common-law doctrine 
as part of its review.”); Brief of Intellectual Property Professors as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 15-21, Merck KGaA v. Integra 
Lifesciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005) (No. 03-1237) (“Th[is] case therefore 
does not provide a good opportunity for the Court to determine the reach of the 
traditional experimental use exemption.  There are, however, important 
reasons for the Court to state explicitly that any decision in this case does not 
foreclose the assertion of the traditional experimental use exemption.”).  
However, other parties favoring the exemption requested that the Court 
consider the issue.  See Brief of Amici Curiae Consumer Project on Technology, 
Electronic Frontier Foundation & Public Knowledge in Support of Petitioner 
at 24-30, Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005) 
(No. 03-1237) [hereinafter EFF Amicus Brief] (“It is critically important that 
the Court take this opportunity to correct the Federal Circuit’s improperly 
narrow interpretations of the experimental use exception in Roche, Embrex, 
Madey, and this case.”); Brief for Amicus Curiae Bar Association of the District 
of Columbia — Patent, Trademark & Copyright Section in Support of Neither 
Party at passim, Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372 
(2005) (No. 03-1237) (“An experimental use exemption is recognized either by 
statute or by common law in developed countries and is fundamentally 
necessary to foster innovation.  Failure to recognize this important exemption 
to infringement will deter research in the United States and encourage 
companies to conduct their research and development off-shore.”).  The  
various briefs from the case are available on Dennis Crouch’s Patently-O Blog, 
at http://patentlaw.typepad.com/patent/2005/02/merck_kgaa_stat.html (last 
visited Aug. 12, 2005). 
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patents in the pool.224  Patent pools typically charge royalties 
and then redistribute the royalties to their members according 
to an agreed formula.225  Although these royalty payments can 
be very important, in many instances the main function of a 
patent pool is to provide access to the patents in the pool, not to 
make money directly.226 
Historically, patent pools have arisen in such industries as 
the early airplane and automobile industries, where a few 
competing manufacturers held overlapping patents that 
blocked each other and thus prevented any of the 
manufacturers from making any products.227  These blocking 
problems were often resolved with patent pools.228  More 
recently, patent pools have been used to resolve blocking 
situations that were preventing deployment of the MPEG-2 
video compression format and DVD-video/DVD-ROM 
formats.229  Indeed, a patent pool has been repeatedly proposed 
as a solution to the similar blocking problems that are arising 
in the biotechnology area.230  Many of the historical patent 
                                                          
 224. See Merges, supra note 130, at 1340-42. 
 225. See id. at 1341-42. 
 226. See, e.g., id. at 1344 (“[In the airplane patent pool,] most licensing was 
conducted on a royalty-free basis, with mutual forbearance from infringement 
suits as the real payment for the exchange.”); id. at 1346 (“As with the 
[airplane pool], most members of the automobile pool seemed content to rely 
on the blanket, royalty-free cross licensing that was also available under the 
pool.”). 
 227. See id. at 1340-47; see also Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On 
the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 888-91 (1990) 
(discussing the impact of patents on the development of the automobile and 
airplane industries). 
 228. See Merges, supra note 130, at 1340-47. 
 229. See JEANNE CLARK ET AL., U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, 
PATENT POOLS: A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF ACCESS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY 
PATENTS? 4-5 (2000), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/patentpool.pdf. 
 230. See, e.g., id. at 8-11; David B. Resnik, A Biotechnology Patent Pool: An 
Idea Whose Time Has Come?, J. PHIL., SCI. & L. (Jan. 23, 2003), 
http://www.miami.edu/ethics/jpsl/archives/papers/biotechPatent.html; 
Lawrence M. Sung & Don. J. Pelto, Greater Predictability May Result in 
Patent Pools: As the Federal Circuit Refines Scope of Biotech Claims, Use of 
Collective Rights Becomes Likely, NAT’L L.J., June 22, 1998, at C2.  This 
proposal dates back at least as far as 1983.  See Stanford, California Push 
Patent-Pool—With Caution, BIOTECHNOLOGY NEWSWATCH, Mar. 21, 1983, at 5 
(discussing a proposed patent pool for basic biotechnology research tools).  Not 
everyone supports this proposal, however.  See Bradley J. Levang, Comment, 
Evaluating the Use of Patent Pools for Biotechnology: A Refutation to the 
USPTO White Paper Concerning Biotechnology Patent Pools, 19 SANTA CLARA 
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 229 (2002). 
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pools, however, ultimately required government intervention to 
get the pool started.231  To date, no comprehensive patent pools 
have arisen in the biotechnology field. 
II. BAYH-DOLE: PRIOR CRITICISM AND PROPOSED 
SOLUTION 
The Bayh-Dole Act has been, in the estimation of many, 
very successful in getting more government-funded inventions 
into private hands so they can be developed for the use of the 
public.  The Bayh-Dole Act has also been the subject of 
substantial criticism.  And as with any criticized statute, 
suggestions for its reform abound.  This Section focuses on one 
particular criticism and proposed reform. 
A. THE CRITICS: RAI AND EISENBERG 
In their article Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of 
Biomedicine,232 Professors Rai and Eisenberg express 
dissatisfaction with the current implementation of the Bayh-
Dole Act and propose a solution that, while perhaps appealing 
in the abstract, is unworkable in practice.  Professors Rai and 
Eisenberg appear to accept the basic premise behind the Bayh-
Dole Act—that is, some inventions created with federal funds 
will not be developed into products without a patent.233  
However, they also point out that many other federally funded 
inventions will still be developed, or in fact do not need further 
development, even in the absence of a patent.234  In the latter 
cases, the patent is unnecessary and only imposes a tax on 
future research, or in some cases even blocks such future 
research.235  Their primary concern is that the current Act 
creates a heavy bias in favor of patenting all inventions, 
whether such patenting advances development of the invention, 
or merely imposes a tax or erects a block.236 
                                                          
 231. See Merges, supra note 130, at 1356-57 & n.226 (discussing formation 
of the aircraft and synthetic rubber research patent pools at the behest of the 
government, triggered by entry in to World War I and II, respectively). 
 232. Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 9. 
 233. See id. at 302-03.  They cite as an example the machines that have 
been developed for rapid DNA sequencing.  See id.  But see Eisenberg, supra 
note 1 (expressing deep skepticism about Bayh-Dole and its rationale). 
 234. See Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 300. 
 235. See id. 
 236. See id. at 291, 303. 
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As an example, they cite the Cohen-Boyer patent on basic 
recombinant DNA techniques.237  The research leading to this 
patent, which covered technology fundamental to the 
biotechnology industry, was conducted with government 
funding, and once created, the invention required no further 
development.238  The employers of the researchers, Stanford 
University and the University of California, patented the 
invention anyway, and then widely licensed the patent 
nonexclusively at a low royalty rate to anyone who requested a 
license.239  Thus, the patent on the techniques offered no 
incentive effects at all—the spread of the invention would have 
been the same if it had been dedicated to the public domain.  
The patent served only to bring in revenue to the universities, 
at the cost of imposing a tax on essentially all biotechnology 
research.240 
Such a tax on research is, however, only part of the 
problem.  The Cohen-Boyer patent was at least licensed widely 
and with relatively few restrictions.241  Professors Rai and 
Eisenberg express concern over fundamental patents similar to 
Cohen-Boyer that are not licensed to all comers, but are instead 
kept exclusive.242  Such patents have the potential to block 
large areas of research, severely limiting their further 
development.  As an example, the authors discuss the current 
state of research into human embryonic stem cells.243  And even 
when the patentee is amenable to licensing, the licensing may 
not take place, for a variety of reasons.244  Even when licensing 
does eventually take place, the costs and delays in reaching the 
agreement will have an adverse impact on the research 
                                                          
 237. See id. at 300-01. 
 238. Id. at 300. 
 239. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
AND THE DISSEMINATION OF RESEARCH TOOLS IN MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 41 
(1997); Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 300. 
 240. See Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 300.  But see Ramirez, supra 
note 105, at 376 (“The Cohen-Boyer patent is a positive example of the benefits 
of patenting research tools.”). 
 241. See Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 300. 
 242. See id. at 301. 
 243. See id. at 301.  Indeed, their concern that research into these 
embryonic stem cells will be (or already has been) blocked seems to be the 
driving force behind their proposal.  See id. at 292-93, 296, 301-02, 309-10, 
313. 
 244. See id. at 297-98.  Some of the reasons for bargaining breakdown and 
how this breakdown may lead to an “anticommons” are discussed in more 
detail supra Part I.B.2. 
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These disadvantages may occur with either category of 
invention, those that would have been developed without a 
patent and those that would not have been developed.  If the 
invention would not have been developed without the patent, 
then these disadvantages may simply be acceptable costs of the 
system.246  When the invention would have been developed 
anyway, however, then these disadvantages simply become 
drags on the research system, with no concomitant benefit.247  
The primary concern of Professors Rai and Eisenberg is that 
the current Act strongly favors patents, making no distinction 
between the two categories.  Thus, many important inventions 
are being unnecessarily locked up by patents, creating needless 
costs and blocks to the research enterprise.248 
B. THEIR PROPOSED SOLUTION 
To address this problem, Professors Rai and Eisenberg 
propose giving the NIH the duty of analyzing each funding 
agreement it makes to determine into which category any 
resulting invention will fit, and then basing the decision to 
award or deny the funding recipient the right to seek patents 
on this determination.249  If an invention needs further 
development, then the inventor should be permitted to seek a 
patent for it (and this should be the presumptive route).  If, 
however, the invention is fundamental and needs no further 
development, or such development would proceed even without 
a patent, then the inventor should not be permitted to seek a 
patent for it.250 
Professors Rai and Eisenberg then explore the mechanisms 
in the current Bayh-Dole Act by which the NIH might exercise 
such power.251  They first look to 35 U.S.C. §202(a)(ii), which 
provides that the agency may, “in exceptional circumstances . . 
                                                          
 245. See Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 297. 
 246. See id. at 302-03 (discussing situations where patenting is justified). 
 247. See id. at 300-02 (discussing situations where patenting is not 
justified). 
 248. See id. at 300-03. 
 249. See id. at 303-310 (discussing why NIH is the appropriate body for 
making this determination); id. at 310-13 (discussing how to give NIH this 
authority). 
 250. See id. at 310-11. 
 251. Id. at 310-13. 
PULSINELLI_FINAL.DOC 05/11/2006  02:13:22 PM 
2006] SHARE AND SHARE ALIKE 433 
. determin[e] . . . that restriction or elimination of the right to 
retain title to any subject invention will better promote the 
policy and objectives of this chapter.”252  Thus, if the agency 
determines that the inventions likely arising from research 
under a proposed funding agreement would be better developed 
if they were not patented, the agency can draft the funding 
agreement to prevent the researcher from patenting any 
resulting inventions.  While this provision would seem ideally 
suited to their purposes, the authors note that in fact it is an 
unwieldy tool.253  First, the term “exceptional circumstances” 
suggests that this section should be applied only on rare 
occasions; it should not be a routine part of the funding 
decision.254  Second, use of the provision carries with it the 
requirement that the agency follow specific procedures 
designed to protect the rights of the funding recipient.  These 
procedures include “an elaborate administrative procedure for 
challenging such determinations, with a right of appeal to the 
United States Claims Court.”255  Any time an agency makes 
such a determination, it must also notify the Commerce 
Department and provide a detailed analysis justifying the 
decision.256  These limitations make this provision unsuitable 
for routine use, including the purpose envisioned by the 
authors.257 
Professors Rai and Eisenberg next consider using the 
funding agency’s “march-in” powers to compel licensing of 
university patents.258  However, they conclude that, although 
these powers are not limited by the “exceptional circumstances” 
requirement, they are similarly unsuitable for the authors’ 
purposes because they are subject to similar procedural 
hurdles:259 The rights may be exercised only for the very 
narrow reasons set forth in the statute, and the procedure is 
extremely slow because the actual transfer of rights to other 
parties is deferred until the completion of elaborate 
                                                          
 252. 35 U.S.C. § 202(a)(ii) (2000 & Supp. II 2002). 
 253. See Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 310. 
 254. See id. at 293, 310. 
 255. Id. at 293. 
 256. See id. at 293 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 202(b)(1)). 
 257. See id. at 310; see also id. at 294 n.28 (noting that NIH has only 
declared exceptional circumstances in one case of which the authors are 
aware). 
 258. See id. at 294, 311 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 203).  March-in under Bayh-Dole 
is discussed supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text. 
 259. See Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 294. 
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administrative proceedings and subsequent court appeals.260  
The authors further note that the NIH has never used the 
march-in right.261  Thus, they conclude that the existing 
provisions of the Bayh-Dole Act are unsuitable for their 
purposes. 
To address these problems with the existing Bayh-Dole 
regime, Professors Rai and Eisenberg propose two “modest 
reforms.”262  First, they propose that “the circumstances in 
which an agency may depart from the statutory presumption 
that the [funding recipient] may retain title to an invention in 
the terms of particular grants should be liberalized” by deleting 
the “exceptional circumstances” language.263  According to the 
authors: 
Once the “exceptional circumstances” language is deleted, the 
substantive standard set forth in the current statutory language, 
which permits departure from the usual rule “when it is determined 
by the agency that restriction or elimination of the right to retain title 
to any subject invention will better promote the policy and objectives 
of this chapter,” could be more freely applied to achieve the legislative 
goal of promoting widespread dissemination and use of research 
results.264 
They also propose streamlining the existing administrative 
review process and allowing infringing research to proceed 
while the agency and courts conduct their respective reviews.265 
Second, the authors propose to modify the march-in right, 
removing the requirement that the government hold the 
authority in abeyance until the parties exhaust all court 
appeals.  They argue that this requirement, with its inherent 
delays, is in conflict with the time-sensitive substantive 
reasons for which march-in is permitted, such as achieving 
practical application of the invention within a “reasonable 
time” and “alleviat[ing] health or safety needs.”266  They note, 
however, that judicial review should be preserved for these 
march-in cases, as the post-issuance exercise of march-in rights 
“disturbs settled expectations of grantees and licensees that 
may underlie investments,” which could lead to industry 
                                                          
 260. See id. (citing 35 U.S.C. § 203(a), (b)). 
 261. See id. & n.35. 
 262. Id. at 310. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 265. See id. 
 266. Id. at 311 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 203(a)(1), (2) (2000 & Supp. II 2002)). 
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“becom[ing] wary of investing in university-based 
technology.”267 
Armed with these two reforms, Professors Rai and 
Eisenberg believe, the NIH can determine which inventions 
should be patented and which should not, and control its 
funding recipients accordingly. 
C. CRITIQUE OF THE SOLUTION 
One initial critique of this solution is that the view 
Professors Rai and Eisenberg take is a narrow one.  After all, 
after the fact one can always point to patented inventions, 
government-funded or not, that would have been developed 
even without the patent incentive.  Rather, what is important 
is the overall effect on the technology transfer/invention 
development system of having patents available in the first 
place.  Instead of viewing it as a failure, the success of Cohen-
Boyer should be seen as a victory for the Bayh-Dole Act.  The 
revenue made by Stanford and the University of California has 
made researchers and institutions much more aware of the 
value of watching for patented technology and getting it out of 
the labs, thereby serving the ultimate goals of Bayh-Dole.268  
Furthermore, revenue from university-owned patents often 
goes toward funding more research, reducing the need for 
government funding269 and thereby funding research by taxing 
those using the technology, rather than the population in 
general.270 
                                                          
 267. Id. 
 268. See Ramirez, supra note 105, at 376 (arguing that after Cohen-Boyer, 
“inventors and universities recognized the benefits of making the technology 
broadly available”); cf. Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 1712 (“Of course, 
universities would have no reason to cooperate in technology transfer on a 
royalty-free basis . . . .”). 
 269. According to Professor Thomas Massaro at the University of Virginia 
School of Medicine: 
  It has become very logical—and in fact very necessary—for 
research universities to more aggressively seek the profits that may 
be generated through patents, licenses, and royalties.  In this cash-
dry environment, universities are enamored with the possibility of 
generating new revenues by commercializing the products of their 
research.  We are trying to use the proceeds from the “downstream” 
results of research to feed back “upstream” research itself. 
Massaro, supra note 5, at 1734. 
 270. Professor Massaro continues: 
  To the extent that universities are successful in feeding the 
“upstream” with “downstream” revenues, society is well served.  The 
Bayh-Dole legislation's superordinate goals of getting new ideas into 
PULSINELLI_FINAL.DOC 05/11/2006  02:13:22 PM 
436 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 7:2 
 
 
However, the basic hypothesis advanced by Professors Rai 
and Eisenberg has merit: The Act provides important 
incentives for getting many inventions developed, but some 
inventions would have been developed even without the 
incentives of the Bayh-Dole Act, and such inventions should be 
made more widely available.271  Nevertheless, their proposed 
solution—requiring the NIH to determine in advance which 
funding agreements will result in inventions that should be 
patented and which will result in inventions that should not be 
patented, and to act accordingly—is unworkable, for a variety 
of reasons.272 
The basis of their proposal is that Congress should delete 
the “exceptional circumstances” language from §202(a)(ii), 
thereby giving the NIH broader discretion to determine 
whether each individual funding agreement should or should 
not permit the funding recipient to seek patents on any 
resulting inventions.  If the agency decides that the funding 
agreement will result in an invention (or inventions) that needs 
the Act’s incentives for further development, the agreement 
should permit the funding recipient to obtain patents and grant 
exclusive licenses to the patents.  If instead the agency decides 
that the funding agreement will result in an invention (or 
inventions) that will be better developed and used without the 
incentives, the agreement should require the funding recipients 
to forego patenting, and the invention should be dedicated to 
the public.  However, the NIH (and other federal agencies) had 
exactly that discretion prior to Bayh-Dole, and their reluctance 
to permit funding recipients to obtain patents and grant 
                                                          
the marketplace is being met. . . . [Professor Eisenberg] suggests that 
from the point of view of the consumer, royalties paid to the 
university are just another tax.  Of course at one level this is true.  A 
more realistic view is that universities are government contract 
laboratories distinguished by the efficiency with which they can help 
defray their operating overhead by a form of “user fees.”  Such 
royalty-derived user fees align the incentives of society and the 
university research community better than most other mechanisms in 
the sense that such fees are paid by a defined group that in principle 
benefits from the good (university research) more than the general 
public. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 271. Indeed, the Harbridge House report identified exactly this same issue 
thirty-five years earlier.  See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
 272. It must be noted that Professors Rai and Eisenberg do address many 
of the criticisms discussed in this part.  However, they underestimate the 
actual difficulties they do address, and fail to consider others. 
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licenses (especially exclusive licenses) is what led to the 
passage of the Act in the first place.273  The authors address 
this criticism, arguing that the tide has turned in the last 
twenty-five years and that the NIH now understands and 
embraces its role in technology transfer.274  Although that may 
be true in the short term, it is entirely plausible that the NIH, 
freed from the shackles of Bayh-Dole, will eventually revert to 
its old instincts and again become reluctant to allow funding 
recipients to obtain patents and grant exclusive licenses.275 
A more fundamental question is that of institutional 
competence.  Simply put, will the NIH be any good at 
determining which funding agreements will result in 
inventions that should be patented (because they need further 
development) and which will result in inventions that should 
                                                          
 273. See supra Part I.A.1 (discussing the history of the Bayh-Dole Act). 
 274. See Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 311. 
 275. Indeed, history suggests that the NIH might well do exactly that.  As 
noted supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text, one of the events that led to 
the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act was that HEW (the agency that then had 
authority over the NIH), after ten years of stability, began reconsidering its 
licensing policies.  To quote Professor Eisenberg: 
  Apparently the immediate trigger for introduction of the Bayh-
Dole bill was frustration on the part of universities with changes in 
the way HEW and DoD handled patent rights in their inventions.  
The change at HEW followed a relatively harmonious decade after the 
agency responded in the late 1960s to sharp criticism from the 
General Accounting Office of its handling of patent rights in the NIH 
medicinal chemistry program.  The agency response was to allow 
universities with approved technology transfer capabilities to retain 
title to patents and to grant exclusive licenses to industry under the 
terms of Institutional Patent Agreements (“IPAs”).  IPAs conferred 
rights in universities on a prospective basis, without the need for 
case-by-case requests for a government waiver after an invention had 
been made, thereby eliminating uncertainty and bureaucratic delays 
for universities that sought patent rights. 
  Then, in a 1978 draft report, HEW’s Office of General Counsel 
recommended that use of IPAs be reconsidered on the ground that 
they encourage exclusive licensing and thereby limit the agency’s 
control over the availability and cost of HEW-supported inventions.  
Around the same time, the HEW general counsel’s office began taking 
longer to review case-by-case requests for a waiver of government 
patent rights after inventions had been made.  These developments 
caused concern that HEW might be reverting to its pre-1968 policies 
and created pressure for legislation that would make permanent and 
nondiscretionary the arrangements that the agency had previously 
implemented on a discretionary basis. 
Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 1691-92 (footnotes omitted); cf. Heller & Eisenberg, 
supra note 132, at 700 (“[A] politically accountable government agency such as 
NIH may further its public health mission by using its intellectual property 
rights to ensure widespread availability of new therapeutic products at 
reasonable prices.”). 
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not (because they do not need such development)?  After all, the 
NIH is an institution established for the advancement of 
scientific knowledge, through direct research of its own and 
funding of other researchers nationwide.276  Most of the 
personnel consist of current or former research scientists who 
are not versed in the arcana of the invention-development 
literature.  The skills needed to perform or to manage the 
funding of basic scientific research are quite different from 
those needed to make the very subtle determination of whether 
a particular discovery will be better developed with exclusive 
rights.277  Professors Rai and Eisenberg do suggest that the 
NIH could employ policy experts on innovation to help with this 
problem,278 but a handful of experts cannot overcome the 
institutional deficiency of the NIH personnel as a whole. 
Furthermore, all those people at the NIH already have jobs 
to do—and so who, exactly, will make these patenting 
determinations?  Even if funding could be found to hire some 
new personnel for this purpose, it is unlikely to be sufficient to 
the task.  Ann Roberson, the former president of the University 
of Tennessee Research Corporation, calculates that it would 
require an “army” of at least 1000 new employees to do the job 
properly.279  However, the NIH is unlikely to receive funding to 
hire even one-tenth that number, even assuming such a 
number of qualified people actually existed and desired the job.  
The result will be a cadre of overworked analysts and a pile of 
underanalyzed funding agreements—not a formula likely to 
bring about the desired result.280 
                                                          
 276. See National Insts. of Health, Questions and Answers About NIH, 
http://www.nih.gove/about/FAQs.htm#NIH (last visited Mar. 24, 2006). 
 277. Professors Rai and Eisenberg do spend considerable time justifying 
this role for the NIH.  See Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 303-310.  
However, they discuss only NIH as an institution, not the individual people 
who make up the institution.  The people are the ones who will ultimately 
need to make the relevant determinations, not the “institution.” 
 278. See id. at 312. 
 279. Personal Communication from Ann Roberson, Former President, 
Univ. of Tenn. Research Corp. (Feb. 10, 2004).  In an interview, Dr. Mark 
Rohrbaugh, Director of the Office of Technology Transfer at the National 
Institutes of Health, seconded this view, at least in principal.  Telephone 
Interview with Dr. Mark Rohrbaugh, Director, Office of Tech. Transfer, 
National Insts. of Health (Sept. 22, 2004) [hereinafter Rohrbaugh Interview]. 
 280. Indeed, this is the very situation that plagues the Patent and 
Trademark Office (PTO)—too few personnel to handle the amount of work, 
meaning that examiners are rarely able to invest the time required to do a 
proper patentability analysis on each application.  Thus, the PTO is routinely 
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Finally, there is the issue of institutional bias: What will 
be the tendencies of the NIH when deciding what gets patented 
and what does not?  Professors Rai and Eisenberg discuss the 
public choice model in this context, noting that skeptics might 
fear that “our proposal would tempt agencies like NIH to use 
their discretion to justify an allocation of greater resources to 
expand their own roles,” using “ostensibly public-spirited 
arguments for public funding as a means of promoting 
widespread access to research results, when in fact these 
arguments would cover self-serving efforts to expand the scope 
of its own research, even in research areas where the private 
sector is already operating.”281  They dismiss the concern, 
however, noting that the “public-spirited arguments” may well 
be persuasive in this context, even if their underlying source is 
simply the agency trying to enhance its power.282  They do not, 
however, address what happens when the arguments are not 
persuasive and the agency makes decisions that are entirely 
self-serving based on pretextual “public-spirited arguments.”  
Furthermore, this argument would seem to undercut the entire 
rationale for the Bayh-Dole Act—if these “public-spirited 
arguments” are so persuasive, then why does the Act require 
the opposite result?  If Professors Rai and Eisenberg truly 
believe this argument, then they should be arguing for the 
abolition of the Act, not its fine-tuning.283 
A related concern about bias arises upon considering how 
the NIH is comprised.  As noted above, most of the people at 
the NIH are scientists or former scientists, and as a 
consequence they largely share a particular ethos.  Both 
Professor Eisenberg and Professor Rai have written about the 
“norms of science” that lead scientists to view their work as a 
piece of a larger endeavor to understand the world.284  This 
                                                          
criticized for the poor quality of many of the patents it issues.  See, e.g., 
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 172, at 46-63 (chapter entitled 
“Seven Criteria for Evaluating the Patent System: Ensuring High-Quality 
Patents”); id. at 51-52 (subchapter entitled “Workload Pressures on the 
USPTO”). 
 281. Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 311-12. 
 282. See id. at 312. 
 283. Cf. generally Eisenberg, supra note 1 (attacking the underpinnings of 
Bayh-Dole and creating the impression that she would not be adverse to 
abolishing it, at least insofar as it covers universities and related nonprofit 
entities). 
 284. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science 
in Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177 (1987); Arti K. Rai, Regulating 
Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 
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view leads them to favor widespread sharing of results, 
techniques, and reagents, and to view proprietary rights with 
great skepticism.285  Given the power to decide what should and 
should not be patented, these scientists are likely to show a 
bias toward finding that funding recipients should not be 
permitted to patent their inventions, in an attempt to move the 
scientific enterprise away from its modern emphasis on 
proprietary rights and bring it back to these norms of free 
sharing. 
The authors also note the danger that “funding agencies 
such as NIH might use their expanded discretion over 
patenting decisions to respond to political pressures unrelated 
to the legitimate goal of mediating the tension between access 
and product development,” particularly in controversial areas 
such as research involving human embryos.286  Unable to 
dismiss this concern, they express the hope that judicial review 
of agency decisions will restrain this type of conduct.287  Given 
the extreme deference courts must give to discretionary agency 
decisions such as these that are highly fact-dependent and rely 
heavily on agency expertise,288 that hope seems wildly 
optimistic at best. 
All of these problems are significant practical hurdles to 
the proposed review mechanism.  However, the fundamental 
issue is whether anyone can make the kind of determinations 
required by the proposal.  Even assuming that the NIH hires a 
large number of people who are experts in the field, who can 
overcome any institutional biases and political pressure, and 
                                                          
NW. U. L. REV. 77 (1999) [hereinafter Rai, Norms of Science].  Not everyone 
agrees with this picture of the scientific enterprise.  See F. Scott Kieff, 
Facilitating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of 
Science—A Response to Rai and Eisenberg, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 691 (2001) 
(arguing this view of science is too abstract to be of use in setting patent 
policy).  But see Arti K. Rai, Evolving Scientific Norms and Intellectual 
Property Rights: A Reply to Kieff, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 707 (2001) (countering 
Kieff by arguing that scientific norms are instructive in encouraging patents). 
 285. See generally Eisenberg, supra note 284; Rai, Norms of Science, supra 
note 284.  This description is a vast oversimplification of a much more 
nuanced argument. 
 286. Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 313. 
 287. See id. 
 288. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000) (setting out standards of review of agency 
actions under the Administrative Procedure Act); Chevron USA, Inc. v. 
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984) (expounding the 
“Chevron doctrine” of deference to administrative agencies). 
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who have the best intentions of implementing the proposed 
scheme perfectly, can these experts make the correct decisions?  
The proposed reform requires in effect a two-step ex ante 
analysis at the time a funding agreement is drafted: (1) Predict 
what invention or inventions will be created under the funding 
agreement, and then (2) predict whether any such postulated 
invention(s) will be better developed with a patent or without 
one.  Given the high frequency with which the actual direction 
of a research project diverges from the initial planned direction, 
even the first prognostication step is fraught with difficulty.  
The second, more difficult step then requires looking further 
into the future and predicting the course of development of the 
postulated invention and of subsequent inventions that might 
derive from the postulated invention.  However, in all but the 
most obvious cases, this latter determination is almost 
impossible to make.289  Even a cursory glance at the invention 
development literature reveals both the wide range of 
viewpoints on the process of development and the lack of 
consensus of what will and will not lead to optimum 
development of inventions.290  Even in hindsight, determining 
whether a patent facilitated or hindered the development of an 
invention can be exceedingly difficult; making such a 
determination in advance promises to be almost impossible.  
Combining the two predictive steps makes an accurate 
determination virtually unattainable. 
For these reasons, the Rai and Eisenberg proposal would 
                                                          
 289. In a footnote, the authors appear to acknowledge this difficulty, but 
they have very little to say about its solution; indeed, the footnote only 
compares making ex ante decisions with making ex post decisions: 
To be sure, action ex ante may be problematic to the extent that it 
may sometimes be difficult to determine at the outset whether 
particular research is best distributed broadly or under a regime of 
property rights. As discussed in the text, however, action ex post is 
problematic to the extent that it may disturb settled expectations of 
grantees and licensees. 
Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 310-11, n.114. 
 290. See generally, e.g., Merges & Nelson, supra note 227 and references 
cited therein; NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-
BASED ECONOMY (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen Merrill eds., 2003); Manfredi 
La Manna et al., The Case for Permissive Patents, 33 EUR. ECON. REV. 1427 
(1989); Suzanne Scotchmer, Patents as an Incentive System, in ECONOMICS IN 
A CHANGING WORLD, VOL. 2: MICROECONOMICS (PROCEEDINGS OF THE TENTH 
WORLD CONGRESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS ASSOCIATION—
MOSCOW) 281 (Beth Allen ed., 1996); Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the 
Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 29 (1991). 
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fail in implementation.  However, the goal that they advance is 
a desirable one, and so this Article proposes an alternative 
reform of the Bayh-Dole Act. 
III. AN ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL 
A. THE PROPOSAL 
To better implement the goals of the Bayh-Dole Act, the 
focus should shift from the potential patentee and his or her 
invention (the target of the proposed reform of Professors Rai 
and Eisenberg and many others) to the other end of the 
equation: the users of the technology. 
The primary concern of Bayh-Dole critics, including 
Professors Rai and Eisenberg, tends to be the effect of the Act 
on research that is deemed basic or fundamental.  Such 
fundamental research is typically susceptible to wide 
application in many avenues of further exploration, by a wide 
variety of other researchers who are also doing basic 
research.291  In the United States, such basic research is 
primarily carried out by researchers using government 
funding.292  Thus, most of the basic research that concerns the 
critics will have government funding.  Conversely, the 
government does not, as a rule, fund truly commercial 
development.293  The commercial development that causes the 
critics less concern will therefore likely not have government 
funding.  Categorizing the research as government-funded or 
non-government-funded thus serves as a rough proxy for the 
two categories of research that concern the critics. 
The basic proposal is this: All researchers whose work is 
supported by federal funds should have a limited, royalty-free 
license to make and use for research purposes all inventions 
developed with federal funds.294  Such a system would address 
many of the problems identified by the critics, including 
                                                          
 291. Indeed, with true breakthrough discoveries, the original inventor may 
be incapable of investigating all the avenues that the research opens up, or 
even imagining what all of those avenues are. 
 292. See, e.g., National Insts. of Health, About NIH, 
http://www.nih.gov/about/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2006). 
 293. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 1663-64. 
 294. The license should not extend to the right to sell or otherwise 
commercialize the patented invention for reasons discussed infra Part 
III.C.2.a. 
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Professors Rai and Eisenberg.  Since all government-funded 
researchers (that is, most basic researchers) would have a 
license to all government-funded patents, then almost all of 
those who need access to the basic technology covered by these 
patents will have it.  Conversely, non-government-funded 
researchers (that is, commercial researchers) would still need 
to license the patents, as is proper for commercial enterprises.  
This solution does not suffer from the indicated drawbacks of 
Professors Rai and Eisenberg’s proposed reform, and it would 
also be at least a partial implementation of other proposed 
reforms of patent law designed to solve other problems 
currently affecting this field of law. 
One of the main advantages of such a solution is its 
simplicity: It puts fundamental inventions in the hands of most 
basic researchers without the need to have anyone review each 
funding agreement or to have a court battle over whether an 
invention should be patented or dedicated to the public domain.  
Moreover, it does not require that a particular research project 
be characterized as “basic” or “applied” (or with a related 
labeling scheme)—a distinction required in the implementation 
of many experimental use exemption proposals, but one that is 
often virtually impossible to make in practice.  Instead, the 
only question is whether the research is funded by the 
government or not, a fact that is easily ascertained. 
This proposal also provides at least a partial answer to one 
aspect of the “double paying” problem.295  As noted above, one 
of the lingering concerns over Bayh-Dole is that it forces the 
public to pay twice for inventions funded by the government: 
once when they subsidize the research with tax dollars and 
again when they must pay royalties on the patented invention.  
The broad argument is ultimately unpersuasive, since the real 
choice is between paying once and getting nothing, or paying 
twice and getting the innovation.  However, the idea behind the 
argument has more force in the particular context of the 
government spending tax dollars to develop an invention, then 
spending more tax dollars (in the form of royalties) to use the 
invention in subsequent research it funds.  If researchers 
funded by the government have a royalty-free license to use all 
government-developed technology for research purposes, then 
this second payment is eliminated. 
As an example of the effect of the proposed license, 
                                                          
 295. See supra notes 108-111 and accompanying text. 
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consider the case of human embryonic stem cells.296  Most cells 
in the human body are “differentiated,” meaning that they have 
developed in a way that enables them to perform a very specific 
task.297  Skin cells, blood cells, muscle cells, and nerve cells are 
all examples of differentiated cells.298  Stem cells, in contrast, 
are undifferentiated, and therefore retain the ability to become 
more than one type of differentiated cell.299  For example, blood 
stem cells (actually bone marrow stem cells) retain the ability 
to differentiate into a variety of types of blood cells, including 
red blood cells, white blood cells, and platelets.300  The stem 
cells in adults are of this type, retaining the ability to 
differentiate into a limited number of related differentiated 
cells.301  The embryonic stem cell, however, retains the ability 
to differentiate into any type of cell found in the body.302  In 
addition, most cells taken from the body have a very limited 
lifetime in tissue culture.  Embryonic stem cells, on the other 
hand, can persist for a very long time in culture, which 
facilitates their study and use.303  Scientists believe that this 
ability to persist in culture for a long time and then 
differentiate into any type of body cell makes embryonic stem 
cells ideally suited for use in treating a wide variety of 
diseases.304  “Stem cells, directed to differentiate into specific 
cell types, offer the possibility of a renewable source of 
replacement cells and tissues to treat diseases including 
Parkinson’s and Alzheimer’s diseases, spinal cord injury, 
stroke, burns, heart disease, diabetes, osteoarthritis, and 
rheumatoid arthritis.”305  Embryonic stem cells may also be 
useful for screening new drugs and toxins, and understanding 
                                                          
 296. As indicated above, access to these stem cells seems to be one of the 
primary concerns of Professors Rai and Eisenberg.  See supra note 243.  See 
generally Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 9. 
 297. See National Insts. of Health, Stem Cell Information: Stem Cell Basics 
http://stemcells.nih.gov/staticresources/info/basics/StemCellBasics.pdf (last 
updated Sept. 2002). 
 298. See id. 
 299. See id. 
 300. See id. 
 301. See id. 
 302. See id.  In scientific terms, embryonic stem cells are said to be 
“pluripotent.”  Id. 
 303. See id. 
 304. See id. 
 305. Id. 
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birth defects.306 
Human embryonic stem cells were first isolated in 1998 by 
a team of researchers led by Dr. James Thomson at the 
University of Wisconsin–Madison.307  In earlier work supported 
by funding from the NIH, these researchers had isolated 
embryonic stem cells from rhesus monkeys and macaques.308  
Based on these primate lines and pursuant to the Bayh-Dole 
Act, the university obtained a patent on primate embryonic 
stem cells—which included human embryonic stem cells.309  At 
the time, a moratorium was in place on federal funding of 
research into human embryonic stem cells, and so the 
researchers’ further research into human embryonic stem cells 
was supported by Geron Corporation.310  After the researchers 
successfully used the techniques developed with NIH funding 
to isolate human embryonic stem cells, they obtained a patent 
particularly claiming these cells as well.311  Rather than license 
the patent broadly, the university licensed many of the most 
important uses exclusively to Geron.312  This exclusive license 
gave Geron a potential stranglehold over much of the research 
involving human embryonic stem cells, with the power to 
determine who could perform even basic research with them.313  
As a consequence, many basic researchers desiring to research 
various aspects of the near-limitless uses of stem cells were at 
the mercy of Geron.314 
                                                          
 306. See id. at 3.  For a thorough discussion of the science of stem cells, see 
NATIONAL INSTS. OF HEALTH, STEM CELLS: SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS AND FUTURE 
RESEARCH DIRECTIONS (2001), available at 
http://stemcells.nih.gov/staticresources/info/scireport/PDFs/fullrptstem.pdf. 
 307. See NATIONAL INSTS. OF HEALTH, supra note 306, at ES-4. 
 308. See Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 293 n.23. 
 309. See id. (citing Primate Embryonic Stem Cells, U.S. Patent No. 
5,843,780 (filed Jan. 18, 1996)). 
 310. See id. at 293 n.23, 301. 
 311. See id. at 293 n.23 (citing Primate Embryonic Stem Cells, U.S. Patent 
No. 6,200,806 (filed June 26, 1998)). 
 312. The funding agreement in fact required that Geron receive an 
exclusive license to these areas.  See id. at 301.  The licensed uses were to six 
types of differentiated cells derived from embryonic stem cells: neural cells, 
heart cells, pancreatic islet cells (which produce insulin), bone cells, blood cells 
and cartilage cells.  See Andrew Pollack, University Resolves Dispute on Stem 
Cell Patent License, N.Y. TIMES Jan. 10, 2002, at C11. 
 313. See Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 301 (“Exclusive licenses on 
research tools with potentially broad applications threaten to throttle 
scientific progress by limiting the number of players in a developing field.”). 
 314. The NIH was also concerned over this degree of control in a single 
company and persuaded Wisconsin and Geron to modify their agreement 
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Under my proposed Bayh-Dole license, however, Geron’s 
power would have been greatly diminished.  Any recipient of 
government funding wishing to study these embryonic stem 
cells would be free to do so, under the terms of the proposed 
license—the government funded the research leading to the 
patent, and thus subsequent researchers who are also funded 
by the government would have licenses to use the patented 
technology.315  The researchers would also be excused from 
paying royalties to Geron, freeing tax dollars to support other 
research.  Thus, the proposed license would remove many of the 
barriers erected by patents obtained under the Bayh-Dole Act. 
B. POTENTIAL IMPACT 
Before considering whether such a proposal should be 
implemented, its effects on the overall Bayh-Dole scheme, and 
patent law incentives generally, need to be explored.  Of critical 
importance is how commercial entities will respond to the 
change in the Bayh-Dole Act, and whether they will be more 
reluctant to develop technology created with government 
funding if the market of potential users is thus limited by the 
removal of government-funded researchers with the royalty-
free license.  Also important, however, are its positive aspects, 
as the proposed license may be seen as at least a start in 
developing a more robust experimental use exemption and a 
biotechnology patent pool. 
1. Potential Impact on Patent Incentives 
Granting government-funded researchers a license to 
patents arising from government-funded inventions might have 
an adverse affect on licensing those patents for further 
development.  In particular, the proposed Bayh-Dole license 
                                                          
(resolving a lawsuit by the university against the company).  See id. at 301 
n.65, 309-10.  Geron ceded exclusive control over three of the differentiated 
cell types, retaining only neural cells, heart cells and pancreatic islet cells.  
See Pollack, supra note 312.  Both Wisconsin and Geron also agreed to allow 
free use of the cells by academic and government scientists for research 
purposes, retaining rights only for commercial use.  See id. 
 315. This of course ignores other restrictions on embryonic stem cell 
research, particularly President Bush’s ban on using federal funding to 
perform research on stem cell lines other than those existing at the time the 
ban was implemented on August 9, 2001.  See Press Release, The White 
House, Fact Sheet: Embryonic Stem Cell Research (Aug. 9, 2001), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/08/20010809-1.html. 
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raises the issue of whether the free use of the patented 
invention in research that eventually results in a commercial 
product will have a negative effect on the market for the 
patented invention and thus destroy the incentive to develop 
the patented invention—a result contrary to the purpose of the 
Bayh-Dole Act. 
If the resulting commercial product contains the patented 
invention, and thus still infringes the patent, no problem 
arises—the patentee will still control commercial use of the 
final product since the proposed license does not include the 
right to sell.316  For example, the hair restorer minoxidil was 
originally patented as a compound for treating high blood 
pressure (for which it is still used).317  One of the side effects of 
its use as a high blood pressure treatment was hair growth, 
and this method of use was subsequently patented as well.318  
The original patent on the compound was still in effect at the 
time the later patent issued, however, and so anyone wishing to 
use minoxidil as a hair restorer needed to license the original 
patent.319  Thus, the original patentee was able to collect 
royalties for the use of minoxidil to restore hair and was 
therefore compensated for the subsequent research on and use 
of its patented compound.320  Differentiated human embryonic 
stem cells used directly as a treatment would also fall into this 
category—they will still be covered by the original patent on 
                                                          
 316. See infra Part III.C.2.a. 
 317. See MedicineNet.com, Minoxidil - Oral, 
http://www.medicinenet.com/minoxidil-oral/article.htm (last reviewed Mar. 2, 
2005) (describing use of minoxidil to reduce blood pressure); U.S. Patent No. 
3,461,461 (filed Nov. 1, 1965) (covering the compound now known as minoxidil; 
indicated use is as hypertensive agent). 
 318. See MedicineNet.com, Minoxidil, 
http://www.medicinenet.com/minoxidil/article.htm (last reviewed Dec. 31, 
1997) (describing history and use of minoxidil to restore hair growth); U.S. 
Patent No. 4,139,619 (filed Aug. 19, 1977) (covering the method of using 
minoxidil to restore hair growth). 
 319. This included the owner of the hair-growth-restoration method of use 
patent.  See Norman M. Goldfarb, When Patents Became Interesting in Clinical 
Research, J. CLINICIAL RES. BEST PRACS., Mar. 2006, at 1-2, 
http://www.firstclinical.com/resources/journal/0603/Patents.pdf.  And 
conversely, the holder of the patent on minoxidil itself would need a license to 
the method of use patent to sell minoxidil for hair restoration.  This is thus an 
example of a pair of blocking patents.  See supra notes 126-128 and 
accompanying text. 
 320. In the case of minoxidil, The Upjohn Company was actually the 
assignee of both patents.  See U.S. Patent No. 3,461,461 (filed Nov. 1, 1965); 
U.S. Patent No. 4,139,619 (filed Aug. 19, 1977). 
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the embryonic stem cells themselves, and therefore the 
patentee will be entitled to royalties on the commercial product.  
A similar situation arises when the eventual product is a 
mixture that still includes the patented invention as a 
component.321 
A problem regarding the incentives of the original patentee 
does arise, however, when a researcher uses the patented 
invention during development, but the invention is not present 
in the final commercial product.  In this situation, the patentee 
has no control over sales of the non-infringing commercial 
product and thus cannot recover the costs of developing the 
original patent into a useful invention. 
This problem can manifest itself in two ways.322  First, 
researchers might use the patented invention to improve on, 
design around, or avoid the patent itself.323  For example, a 
researcher might use the patented invention as a point of 
comparison for judging the effectiveness of a new invention.  
Alternatively, the researcher might start with a patented 
device and then gradually modify it until a non-infringing (and 
possibly improved) competing device results.  Some of the 
earliest versions are likely to infringe the patent, even if the 
final device does not.  Such uses would be directly counter to 
the interests of the patentee, but they are nevertheless an 
important aspect of the purpose of experimental use and a 
fundamental part of the patent system—getting patented 
inventions into the hands of researchers so that they can be 
exploited in these ways. 
Second, researchers might use the invention as a tool to 
further other research.  Such research tools are one of the most 
difficult elements of experimental use (and therefore of the 
proposed license, insofar as it implements experimental use).  
For example, a researcher might use a patented DNA or 
protein product in an assay to find a novel pharmaceutical.  
The final pharmaceutical typically will not include the patented 
                                                          
 321. See, e.g., Combinations of Retinoids and Minoxidil-type Compounds 
for Hair Growth, U.S. Patent No. 5,183,817 (filed Dec. 13, 1988); Minoxidil 
Gel, U.S. Patent No. 5,225,189 (filed Feb. 18, 1988); Stimulation of Hair 
Growth with Minoxidil and a 5α-Reductase Inhibitor, U.S. Patent No. 
5,578,599 (filed Jan. 20, 1995). 
 322. These two ways track the distinction between “experimenting on” and 
“experimenting with” the patented invention developed in the discussion of the 
experimental use exemption.  See supra notes 182-197 and accompanying text. 
 323. See FTC INNOVATION REPORT, supra note 175, at ch. 4, at 36. 
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DNA or protein, and so will not itself infringe.  Similarly, a 
researcher might use human embryonic stem cells to assess the 
efficacy and toxicity of a potential drug product.  The final drug 
product will again not fall under the original patent because it 
does not include the human embryonic stem cells, and therefore 
the patentee will not be entitled to royalties on the commercial 
product.  Some would view such a result as a desirable side 
effect of the license proposal, as it helps resolve some perceived 
problems of the current patent system.324  One potential way to 
alleviate some of the harm caused by this situation would be to 
allow the research to proceed without liability but then to 
require payment of a royalty once a commercial product is 
available.325  Many experimental use proposals exclude such 
research tools,326 but they would not be excluded from the 
proposed Bayh-Dole license. 
Research tools do not present a problem with respect to 
development incentives if they do not need further development 
once they have been invented in the laboratory.  The primary 
justification for the Bayh-Dole Act is to provide an incentive to 
get commercial development of government-funded 
inventions;327 the original government funding agreement 
provides the necessary incentive to make the invention in the 
first place.  If no such further development is needed, then the 
Bayh-Dole incentive is similarly unnecessary, as the patentee 
has no development costs to recover—these costs were already 
paid by the government.328  Research tools also do not present a 
                                                          
 324. Some of these problems are discussed supra Parts I.B.2 and I.B.3.  Cf. 
Suzanne T. Michel, Comment, The Experimental Use Exception to 
Infringement Applied to Federally Funded Inventions, 7 HIGH TECH. L.J. 369, 
407 (1992) (“If the experimental work by a non-licensee results in a product 
which designs around the basic research and does not infringe the original 
patent, then federal funds spurred more development at the private level, 
which is the point of government supported research.  A licensee will be forced 
to accept the possibility of increased design around activity.  In response, the 
licensee and licensor can account for the added risk through decreased royalty 
rates.”). 
 325. See supra note 192 (discussing proposals by Mueller, supra note 174, 
and Strandburg, supra note 174, for such a royalty system, as well as the 
difficulties in calculating such a royalty). 
 326. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 174, at 1074. 
 327. See 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2000 & Supp. II 2002). 
 328. As a corollary, the proposed license should result in a reduction in 
patenting of this type of research tool.  If a tool does not need further 
development and is easily used by subsequent basic researchers, then the 
original researcher will have no reason to patent it—most of those who need it 
will be able to use it under the proposed Bayh-Dole license without paying 
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problem if the further-developed product is itself patentable.  
In this case, the commercial developer is protected by the later 
patent, which, not having been developed with government 
funding, is not eligible for the proposed Bayh-Dole license.329 
When research tools require further development in order 
to become commercial products but the further development is 
not itself patentable, they can be handled via other, non-license 
methods of appropriation.  In the biotechnology context, this 
appropriation can commonly be accomplished through 
patenting of kits, where the biotechnology company assembles 
the necessary reagents for patented processes into the kits.330  
These kits greatly ease the conduct of research, as the 
manufacturer takes the responsibility of making sure that each 
necessary solution has precisely the correct composition.  
Despite the fact that these kits typically cost more than the 
individual reagents in them, researchers use them because 
they are efficient, particularly when the time needed to mix the 
reagents (and the time lost in repeating experiments when the 
inevitable mistakes are made) is taken into account.331 
As an example, consider the polymerase chain reaction 
(PCR), one of the fundamental techniques of the modern 
molecular biology laboratory.332  PCR allows scientists to start 
                                                          
royalties, effectively negating the benefits of the patent.  The absence of a 
patent would then free up the tool for use by all, including those ineligible for 
the proposed license, which is good for research tools with wide application. 
 329. This analysis assumes that the subsequent development is not funded 
by the government—a reasonable assumption, as such development is usually 
funded by industry.  See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 1666.  If the subsequent 
development is funded by the government, then the patent incentive should 
again be unnecessary, and so the proposed Bayh-Dole license is appropriate. 
 330. See, e.g., CAFC Considers Validity of Marking with Patent Numbers, 
24 BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REP. 448, 449 (2005). 
 331. Researchers use such kits even when the underlying process is not 
patented, and so they are free to make use of the process/reagent.  For 
example, in the early years of biotechnology research, graduate students often 
started their careers by purifying large quantities of a particular restriction 
enzyme (a protein molecule that operates like a pair of molecular scissors, 
cutting a DNA molecule at a precisely defined location).  They would then 
trade with other students who had purified different restriction enzymes (ones 
that cut DNA in other precise locations).  Personal Communication from 
Haynes W. Sheppard, Jr., Director of Research, IGB Products, Ltd. (1986).  
Once restriction enzymes became commercially available, this practice 
stopped; even though most of the enzymes were not patented, and so students 
were free to continue the practice, it was simply a waste of time to do so. 
 332. See Roche Molecular Diagnostics, PCR Explained, http://www.roche-
diagnostics.com/ba_rmd/pcr_explained02.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2006). 
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with a very small amount of a particular piece of DNA and 
generate large amounts of that DNA rapidly and efficiently 
through a process often referred to as “gene amplification.”333  
The basic chemical reagents needed to perform PCR—reaction 
buffers,334 nucleotides, magnesium chloride—are cheap and 
commonly found in any reasonably equipped laboratory.335  The 
primary enzyme required for performing PCR, Taq 
polymerase,336 is readily available from commercial sources (or 
an ambitious researcher could even produce his or her own 
enzyme).  However, most researchers choose not to mix their 
own reagents, instead preferring to purchase a kit containing 
the necessary reagents, even though these kits often cost more 
than the sum of the individual reagents they contain.337  They 
                                                          
 333. See id. (describing the basic PCR process in detail); see also Roche 
Molecular Diagnostics, Applications of PCR, http://www.roche-
diagnostics.com/ba_rmd/pcr_applications.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2006) 
(describing some of the medical diagnostic uses of PCR); Roche Molecular 
Diagnostics, Chronology of PCR Technology, http://www.roche-
diagnostics.com/ba_rmd/pcr_evolution.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2006) 
(showing a timeline of the development of PCR). 
 334. A “reaction buffer” is a solution containing the salts and other soluble 
elements needed to perform a particular biochemical process; the solution is 
typically “buffered” to maintain a particular pH.  PCR Reaction Buffer consists 
of 100 mM Tris/HCl, 15 mM MgCl2, 500 mM KCl, pH 8.3 (the concentration of 
MgCl2 may be varied for different applications).  See Roche Applied Science, 
Package Insert: PCR Core Kit (4th ver. July 2003), available at 
http://www.roche-applied-science.com/pack-insert/1578553a.pdf.  These 
reagents are all commonly found in the molecular biology laboratory. 
 335. See Connie Veilleux, PCR Technology, 
http://www.accessexcellence.org/LC/SS/PS/PCR/PCR_technology.html (last 
visited Mar. 26, 2006). 
 336. Or a recombinant variant thereof.  See, e.g., Roche Applied Science, 
Product Information: Taq DNA Polymerase, http://www.roche-applied-
science.com/fst/amplification.htm?/sis/amplification/pifs/enzymes/taq.htm (last 
visited Mar. 26, 2006) (“Taq DNA Polymerase is the recombinant form of the 
enzyme from the thermophilic eubacterium Thermus aquaticus BM, expressed 
in E. coli.”); see also Roche Applied Science, Product Information: FastStart 
Taq DNA Polymerase, http://www.roche-applied-
science.com/fst/amplification.htm?/sis/amplification/pifs/enzymes/faststart.htm 
(last visited Mar. 26, 2006) (“FastStart Taq DNA Polymerase is a 
thermostable, chemically modified form of recombinant Taq DNA 
Polymerase.”) 
 337. The popularity of this option is evidenced by the number of companies 
that sell such kits.  See, e.g., Roche Applied Science, Product Information: PCR 
Core Kit, http://www.roche-applied-
science.com/fst/amplification.htm?/sis/amplification/pifs/mixes_kits/pcr_core.ht
m (last visited Mar. 26, 2006); Sigma-Aldrich Co., Online Catalog: PCR Core 
Kit with Taq DNA Polymerase, 
http://www.sigmaaldrich.com/catalog/search/ProductDetail/SIGMA/CORET  
(last visited Mar. 26, 2006).  Some companies have simplified the process even 
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can then simply add their own particular DNA templates and 
primers and perform the reactions quickly and easily.  The kits 
free the researchers from the need to measure and mix all of 
these reagents individually, and also from concern over errors 
in measuring the reagents each time they need to be mixed.338  
And with PCR, kits provide an additional advantage.  DNA 
amplification by PCR is so powerful that even trace amounts of 
contaminating DNA can grow into large artifacts, 
compromising the integrity of the research.  Companies certify 
that their kits are free of such contaminants.339 
From the perspective of the company, kits generally allow 
patentees to recover costs from researchers without needing to 
sue or license them individually—the researchers pay a royalty 
built in to the price of the kit in exchange for a license to use 
the reagent or method embodied in the kit.340  Researchers are 
                                                          
further, mixing the reagents into a single tube.  See, e.g., Promega Corp., 
Online Catalog: PCR Master Mix, 
http://www.promega.com/catalog/CatalogProducts.asp?catalog%5Fname=Prom
ega%5FProducts&category%5Fname=PCR+Master+Mix&description%5Ftext
=PCR+Master+Mix (last visited Mar. 26, 2006); Invitrogen Corp., Online 
Catalog: PCR SuperMixes, 
https://catalog.invitrogen.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=viewCatalog.viewProduct
Details&productDescription=569&CMP=LEC-GCMSSEARCH&HQS=10572 
(last visited Mar. 26, 2006).  A Google search for “PCR Kit” reveals many more 
providers.  See Google, Search Results, 
http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=PCR+Kit (last visited Mar. 26, 2006). 
 338. The advantage of the kits multiplies as the number of reagents 
increases and the degree of precision in amount of each reagent increases.  For 
example, using the PCR to determine the order of the bases in a piece of DNA 
(PCR sequencing) requires many more reagent mixtures than the basic PCR.  
Furthermore, the exact amounts of the nucleotides and special terminator 
nucleotides are crucial, with even slight errors often resulting in failure of the 
process.  For this reason, researchers rarely mix their own sequencing 
reagents, instead relying on commercial kits.  See, e.g., Promega Corp., Online 




%3B%3C%2Fsup%3E+DNA+Cycle+Sequencing+System (last visited Mar. 26, 
2006); USB Corp., Online Catalog: Thermo Sequenase™ Cycle Sequencing Kit, 
http://www.usbweb.com/category.asp?cat=dna&id=78500# (last visited Mar. 
26, 2006). 
 339. See Roche Applied Science, supra note 334.  Furthermore, unlike what 
is present in the researcher’s laboratory, any remaining contaminating DNA is 
unlikely to be the DNA the researcher is studying, reducing the likelihood that 
it will cause problems. 
 340. For example, the package insert for the Roche PCR kit contains the 
following language: 
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willing to pay the additional price for the convenience and 
reproducibility.  Indeed, biotechnology patents (and others) 
often include specific claims directed to kits for performing the 
patented method, for just this reason.341  Thus, kits let 
patentees recover their costs from researchers without having 
to worry about licensing them individually. 
With kits, the true risk to the patentee is competitors who 
sell their own kits, potentially at a reduced cost,342 drawing 
researchers away from the patentee’s kit.  If the kit is itself 
patented, the competitor can be sued directly for selling an 
                                                          
A license under U.S. Patents 4,683,202, 4,683,195, and 4,965,188 or 
their foreign counterparts, owned by Roche Molecular Systems, Inc. 
and F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd (“Roche”), has an up-front fee 
component and a running-royalty component. The purchase price of 
this product includes limited, nontransferable rights under the 
running-royalty component to use only this amount of the product to 
practice the Polymerase Chain Reaction (“PCR”) and related 
processes described in said patents solely for the research and 
development activities of the purchaser. 
Id.  The Invitrogen PCR SuperMixes Product Manual and the Sigma-Aldrich 
PCR Core Kit Technical Bulletin contain identical language.  See Invitrogen 
Life Techs., AccuPrime Pfx SuperMix (Oct. 15, 2004), available at 
http://www.invitrogen.com/content/sfs/manuals/accuprimepfxsupermix_man.p
df; Sigma-Aldrich Co., Technical Bulletin: PCR Core Kit with Taq DNA 
Polymerase (June 2002), available at 
http://www.sigmaaldrich.com/sigma/bulletin/coretbul.pdf.  However, Promega 
Corp. has challenged the validity of the basic PCR patents, and so its PCR 
Master Mix Product Usage Information sheet does not include this language.  
Instead, the Information sheet states: 
The PCR process is covered by patents issued and applicable in 
certain countries. Promega does not encourage or support the 
unauthorized or unlicensed use of the PCR process. Use of this 
product is recommended for persons that either have a license to 
perform PCR or are not required to obtain a license. . . . Certain 
applications of this product are covered by patents issued and 
applicable in certain countries. Because purchase of this product does 
not include a license to perform any patented application, users of 
this product may be required to obtain a patent license depending 
upon the particular application and country in which the product is 
used. 
Promega Corp., Product Usage Information: PCR Master Mix (April 2004), 
available at http://www.promega.com/tbs/9pim750/9pim750.pdf. 
 341. See, e.g., Kits for Amplifying and Detecting Nucleic Acid Sequences, 
U.S. Patent No. 6,197,563 (filed Nov. 18, 1994); Method and Kit or [sic] 
Detecting Antibodies to Antigens of Human Immunodeficiency Virus Type 2 
(Hiv-2), U.S. Patent No. 5,055,391 (filed Jan. 3, 1990); see also In re Ngai, 367 
F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (discussing the patentability of a kit for performing 
a new biotechnology method). 
 342. Competitors can typically undercut the patentee because they can ride 
on the coattails of the patentee, using the patentee’s research to design the kit, 
and thus avoid incurring the patentee’s research costs. 
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infringing kit.343  If the relevant patent claims only the method, 
however, the competitor is not directly infringing, because it is 
not itself practicing the method; it is simply selling a kit that 
allows others to practice the method and infringe the patent.344  
However, in this situation, the patent law still provides a 
remedy: a suit against the competitor for contributory 
infringement or inducing infringement.345  Returning to the 
PCR example, because the technique is so important in the 
molecular biology laboratory, the owners of the patents 
covering various aspects of PCR have repeatedly sued the 
manufacturers of PCR kits for contributory infringement, 
rather than suing individual researchers for direct 
                                                          
 343. See, e.g., In re Cambridge Biotech Corp., 186 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. 
Cir. 1999) (discussing a patent owner’s suit against Cambridge Biotech for 
selling kits for detecting HIV-2 antibodies; some of the claims of one of the 
patents in suit, the ’391 patent, supra note 341, covered kits).  The patentee 
may also sue for direct infringement if the kit contains a component that is 
itself separately patented.  See, e.g., id. (discussing the claims of another 
patent in suit, Peptides Related to Human Immunodeficiency Virus II (HIV-2), 
U.S. Patent No. 5,051,496 (filed Jan. 16, 1987), which covered only particular 
peptides used in the kits). 
 344. In these cases, the individual researchers are the ones actually 
infringing the patent by using the competitor’s kits to perform the patented 
method.  Thus, the patentee could theoretically sue these individual 
researchers for direct infringement.  Patentees, however, are generally 
reluctant to sue individual researchers, in part because it is costly and 
impractical to sue so many parties and in part because the researchers are 
potential customers who are likely to be alienated if they are sued.  See 
Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 188 (1980) (noting that 
the contributory infringement doctrine removed the need for “the patentee to 
undertake the almost insuperable task of finding and suing all the innocent 
purchasers who technically were responsible for completing the 
infringement”); SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 117, at 293 (suggesting in 
a hypothetical that patentees prefer to sue the contributory infringer rather 
than the direct infringers, who “may be present or potential customers” of the 
patentee). 
 345. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2000) (providing cause of action for 
contributory infringement); id. § 271(b) (providing a cause of action for 
inducing infringement).  The competitor will typically be liable for 
contributory infringement for providing a kit for which the only use is to 
infringe the patented method, and for inducing infringement for providing 
specific instructions for performing the infringing method.  For examples of 
such suits in the biotechnology context, see Hybritech Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 4 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1004 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (involving a defendant sued for 
selling diagnostic kits using antibodies and instructions for using them; claims 
of the patent in suit, Immunometric Assays Using Monoclonal Antibodies, U.S. 
Patent No. 4,376,110 (filed Aug. 4, 1980), covered only methods); and 
Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1371 
(Fed.Cir.1986) (same). 
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infringement.346 
Both because the Bayh-Dole license does not extend to 
sales of the patented invention347 and because the commercial 
competitor is not a researcher funded by the government, the 
sale of kits will not be covered by the Bayh-Dole license.  Thus, 
the seller will remain liable for infringement, leaving the 
patentee with its desired remedy.  One important caveat to 
this, however, is that both contributory and induced 
infringement require a direct infringement by someone.  If the 
competitor sells the kit to a researcher who has a Bayh-Dole 
license, then the researcher is not directly infringing, and so 
the competitor cannot be indirectly infringing.348  The license 
therefore needs to be carefully drafted to exclude coverage for 
using a kit made by a competitor in a way that infringes the 
patent, at least in the case where the patentee itself provides 
such a kit commercially.349 
A similar analysis pertains if performing the patented 
method requires a specialized apparatus—the provider of the 
apparatus will be liable for contributory infringement.  For 
example, Professors Rai and Eisenberg discuss DNA 
sequencing machines as a technology that was properly 
patented under Bayh-Dole, because while the underlying 
research tool was created via government-funded research, 
developing the research tool into a commercial product required 
the exclusive licensee to make substantial commercial 
                                                          
 346. See, e.g., Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Promega Corp., 33 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1641, 1642 (N.D. Cal. 1994); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Cetus 
Corp., 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1174 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (infringement counterclaim).  The 
patents at issue in both of these suits, Process for Amplifying, Detecting, 
and/or Cloning Nucleic Acid Sequences, U.S. Patent No. 4,683,195 (filed Feb. 
7, 1986), and Process for Amplifying Nucleic Acid Sequences, U.S. Patent No. 
4,683,202 (filed Oct. 25, 1985), claim only methods. 
 347. See infra Part III.C.2.a. 
 348. See Met-Coil Sys. Corp. v. Korners Unlimited, Inc., 803 F.2d 684, 687 
(Fed. Cir. 1986) (finding no direct infringement because alleged direct 
infringers had implied license to perform the claimed method, and therefore 
defendant could not, as a matter of law, be guilty of contributory 
infringement); Saxe v. Hammond, 21 F.Cas. 593, 594 (C.C.D. Mass. 1875) 
(“There is no evidence, in this record, of a sale to an unlicensed manufacturer” 
as would be required for direct infringement, and therefore no contributory 
infringement).  Of course, as previously discussed, if the kit is directly covered 
by the patent or includes a component that is directly covered, then indirect 
liability is not needed—the patentee can sue the competitor directly on the kit 
claim. 
 349. Cf. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5) (permitting patentee to condition license on 
purchase of a separate product). 
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investment.350  Under the proposed license, researchers could 
build their own sequencing machines without fear of 
infringement liability, but they are very unlikely to do so—they 
can much more efficiently buy the machines from the licensee 
than they can replicate the complex technology involved.351  
Therefore, the value in the patent is in the ability to prevent 
competitors from making and selling machines and 
undercutting the patentee on price, not in the ability to prevent 
researchers from making their own machines.352  Thus, the real 
risk for this category of patented inventions is from market 
competitors making sales, not researchers using the invention 
for their research, and so the proposed Bayh-Dole license will 
not have an adverse affect on the patentee.353 
Thus, the proposed license presents a problem only if a 
research tool (a) needs further development, but (b) the 
developer has no viable way to recover the cost of this 
development other than through direct licensing of the original 
patent.  Although this category of research tools is problematic, 
it is likely to be quite small—most relevant research tools will 
be either simple enough to need no further development or else 
sufficiently complex to be themselves patentable or to require 
                                                          
 350. See Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 302-03 & n.69. 
 351. See EFF Amicus Brief, supra note 223, at 29 n.21 (“Most scientists are 
not engaged in manufacturing and will readily purchase rather than make 
patented products—such as microscopes, reagents, or biological materials—
when they meet specifications and are commercially available for a reasonable 
fee.”). 
 352. A similar point, in a slightly different context, is made by Professor 
Eisenberg.  See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Technology Transfer and the Genome 
Project: Problems with Patenting Research Tools, 5 RISK 163, 173 (1994) 
(“[P]rotection against competitors who would sell the product to researchers 
provides some measure of protection.  So long as other large scale producers 
can be excluded from the market, the patent holder will be able to reap the 
benefits of any significant economies of scale in production of the research 
tool.”).  But see id. (“The lack of a remedy against researchers who make the 
invention themselves would still set an upper bound on the ability of patent 
holders to charge full monopoly prices, since at a certain point researchers 
might find it cost effective to make the research tool themselves rather than to 
buy it from the patent holder.”). 
 353. Not surprisingly, similar suits have arisen in the PCR context, 
concerning the thermocycler apparatus required to perform PCR.  Roche and 
its licensee, Applera Corp., sued a maker of competing thermocyclers for 
indirect infringement of the ’195 and ’202 patents on the basic PCR methods, 
supra note 346, as well as for direct infringement of certain patents on the 
thermocyclers themselves.  See Applera Corp. v. MJ Research Inc., 372 F. 
Supp. 2d 233 (D. Conn. 2005). 
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reagents or apparatus that can be sold as a kit.  Furthermore, 
recovering development costs in such cases is likely to be 
extremely difficult even without the proposed license.  Because 
any infringement would be by individual researchers using 
specific techniques and reagents in their own laboratories, 
without the need to purchase anything commercially that is 
directly tied to the patent, the patentee would have to track 
down and sue each of these researchers individually—an 
endeavor that is likely to be impractical at best, and 
prohibitively expensive.354  One possibility might be to handle 
these inventions in a different way.  For the small class of 
inventions that need further development but for which costs 
cannot be recovered because of the proposed license, then 
perhaps the government should fund such development directly 
via its normal funding channels, rather than leaving it to the 
market via the patent incentive.355 
Another possible objection to the proposal is that a 
required licensing provision would limit the flexibility of the 
agencies to deny such licenses when they determine that such 
licenses would be contrary to the goals of the Bayh-Dole Act.  
As discussed below, Dr. Rohrbaugh indicated that the NIH was 
already implementing a similar scheme into its licenses,356 and 
he suggested that codification could possibly limit the options of 
the NIH.357  If desired, this objection could easily be addressed 
by incorporating flexibility into the implementing documents.  
                                                          
 354. As noted by Professor Eisenberg: 
Making and using a patented invention within a research laboratory 
is not very conspicuous and may never come to the attention of the 
patent holder.  Even if the patent holder knows about the use, it 
might not be worth the trouble and expense of pursuing a lawsuit 
against a researcher who does not represent a significant threat to 
the patent holder’s commercial interests. 
Eisenberg, supra note 174, at 1071-72. 
 355. Cf. Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 1673 (describing a pre-Bayh-Dole 
proposal by the Attorney General that would have implemented this type of 
government-funded development scheme for all government inventions that 
industry was not willing to develop without an exclusive license). 
 356. Transcript of Committee on Intellectual Property in Genomic and 
Protein Research Innovation, National Academies 146 (Feb. 27, 2004), 
available at 
http://www7.nationalacademies.org/step/Genomics_Committee_Meeting_1_tra
nscript.pdf (transcribing, among others, presentation by Dr. Mark Rohrbaugh, 
Director, Office of Technology Transfer, National Institutes of Health, 
discussing NIH policies on technology transfer in the biotechnology area, 
including interpretations of Bayh-Dole) [hereinafter Rohrbaugh Presentation]. 
 357. See Rohrbaugh Interview, supra note 279. 
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However, such flexibility is neither necessary nor desirable.358  
Given the logic behind the proposal, there seem to be no 
circumstances under which the license should be denied.  
Furthermore, making the requirement compulsory on the 
agencies gives them the leverage to demand the right—they 
need merely point to the requirement, without an exception, 
and the funding recipient has no room for argument.  A codified 
right would also be much more resistant to changes in 
administrations (both at the level of the agency and at the level 
of the federal government as a whole).  A codified requirement 
would have the additional advantage of applying to all federal 
agencies, not just the NIH. 
2. Experimental Use 
The proposed reform will implement a limited form of the 
common law experimental use exemption, as it lets 
government-funded researchers infringe certain patents in 
connection with their government-funded research without fear 
of liability.  Its coverage is, of course, less broad than the 
traditional common law experimental use exemption, as it 
applies only to a limited group of patents and researchers, and 
therefore it does not meet all of the goals of experimental use.  
Nonetheless, the proposed Bayh-Dole license is a useful step in 
the right direction. 
The proposed license does not require making a distinction 
between experimenting on the patented invention and using 
the patented invention as a tool for other research;359 the 
government-funded researcher exemption applies to all 
government-funded research that involves the use of inventions 
arising from government-funded research.  However, one 
weakness of its limited scope is that it does not allow 
researchers to use research tools created with private funds, 
which in many instances may be the most important tools.360  
                                                          
 358. See infra note 387 and accompanying text (discussing the advantages 
of uniform treatment of all patents under the proposed licensing scheme). 
 359. As discussed earlier, this can be a difficult distinction to make.  See 
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 239, at 114-15. 
 360. Dr. Rohrbaugh mentions particularly the cre/lox technology for 
generating specific gene mutations and the oncomouse technology for creating 
animal models to study human cancer.  See Rohrbaugh Presentation, supra 
note 356, at 147 (“I would note that we already have a challenge in some cases 
in collaborating with industry in conducting research with proprietary 
materials when industry receives a benefit in terms of an option to license 
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Even so, it is a useful step in the right direction—and if it 
works well, it could serve as a “pilot program” to pave the way 
for broadening the experimental use exemption, either 
voluntarily via some sort of patent pool (as discussed in the 
next Section) or by legislative expansion. 
3. Patent Pools 
In addition to implementing a limited version of the 
common law experimental use exemption, the proposed Bayh-
Dole licensing scheme might also be viewed as a rough patent 
pool.  As described above, in a patent pool, individual patentees 
assign their patents to a single collective entity, in exchange for 
royalties and a license to use the other patents in the pool.  
Since the proposed license does not involve royalties, it would 
not be like a pool in this respect.  However, in many instances, 
the main function of a patent pool is to provide access to the 
patents in the pool, not to make money directly from the patent 
royalties,361 and in this respect the proposal is very much like a 
patent pool. 
The proposed license could, of course, also be viewed (with 
considerable justice) as a compulsory license with royalty of 
zero.362  However, the limited membership in the pool, coupled 
with its reciprocal nature—anyone who uses patents from the 
pool must be doing research funded by the government, and the 
funding would carry the obligation to license any patents 
generated from the research to others doing research funded by 
the government—makes the analogy to a patent pool valid, at 
least in a limited sense. 
Many of the historical patent pools that have arisen to 
resolve blocking problems in various industries ultimately 
                                                          
inventions or rights to data.  This is still a challenge.  It is a challenge with 
Krilocks [sic, cre/lox] and oncomouse.”).  Professors Rai and Eisenberg also 
discuss some of the problems with licensing these technologies, see Rai & 
Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 296 n.40, as do Professors Heller and Eisenberg, 
see Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 133, at 699-700. 
 361. See supra note 226 and accompanying text (discussing the airplane 
and automobile patent pools). 
 362. “The term ‘compulsory licensing’ refers to a governmental requirement 
that a patent owner permit another to perform otherwise infringing acts at a 
mandated rate.”  MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
PATENT LAW 1062 (2d ed. 2003).  Compulsory licenses are rarely found in U.S. 
intellectual property law (there are exceptions in patent law for air pollution 
controls, 42 U.S.C. § 7608 (2000), and atomic energy inventions, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2183 (2000)), although they are more common under international regimes.  
See id. 
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required government intervention to get the pool started.363  
Ideally, that is exactly what will happen under the proposed 
license: The NIH will in effect serve as the holder of the patent 
pool for the benefit of all its researchers.364  Such an outcome 
would advance the underlying goals of Bayh-Dole while 
ameliorating some of its undesired side effects. 
If the proposed Bayh-Dole license is successful, it might 
even serve as the basis for a true patent pool.  Perhaps the NIH 
could expand the pool to allow biotechnology companies doing 
research that is not funded by the government to join the pool.  
These companies would submit their patents for use by 
government-funded researchers in exchange for rights to use 
the other patents in the pool.365  If the pool did expand in this 
way, the NIH might be able to incorporate a limited royalty 
structure, under which the commercial members paid royalties 
for all uses (of patents from government-funded research and 
from other commercial members), while the government-funded 
members paid royalties only to the commercial members, 
retaining the free license to use patents from government-
funded research.366  At this point, the license system would 
operate much like a real biotechnology patent pool, solving 
many of the blocking problems previously discussed, such as 
the problem of the anticommons.  Even if the NIH license pool 
did not itself expand in this way, the industry might see that it 
works well, and thus it might provide the impetus (and 
mechanism) to implement a broad pooling system.367 
                                                          
 363. See Merges, supra note 130, at 1356-57 & n.226 (discussing formation 
of the aircraft and synthetic rubber research patent pools at the behest of the 
government, triggered by U.S. entry in to World War I and II, respectively). 
 364. Cf. id. at 1356 (suggesting that “[t]he government should assist in 
some cases the formation of pools and other exchange mechanisms”). 
 365. Such an innovation might create the need for a screening mechanism 
for the submission of patents to the pool.  Otherwise, companies would have 
an incentive to give worthless patents to the pool, in exchange for rights to the 
valuable patents in the pool, while holding back their own valuable patents 
and continuing to charge royalties.  This situation might be addressed by 
requiring that all patents held by a company be assigned to the pool in 
exchange for access to the pool. 
 366. See Merges, supra note 130, at 1341-42 (“Typically, firms are required 
to license into the pool all patents covering technology of use to the industry.  
In exchange, pool members are permitted to use any other member’s 
technology for a set fee.  Often these fees are calibrated to reflect the 
significance of the technology being licensed.” (footnote omitted)). 
 367. That the industry might be willing to join such pools, possibly even 
without royalties, is evidenced by IBM’s pledge to give 500-plus patents to the 
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C. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The most efficient method of implementation would avoid 
the need for legislative action, if existing law permits; if not, 
then Congress would need to ascertain the best legislative 
solution.  Further, the specific terms of the license need to be 
carefully constructed to implement the proposed license in a 
way that is most useful to researchers while interfering as little 
as possible with the rights of the patentees.  Finally, the 
question of who, exactly, can participate in the license needs to 
be addressed. 
1. Implementation 
As noted above, the current Bayh-Dole Act reserves for the 
government a license to inventions developed with government 
funding: 
With respect to any invention in which the contractor elects rights, 
the Federal agency shall have a nonexclusive, nontransferrable [sic], 
irrevocable, paid-up license to practice or have practiced for or on 
behalf of the United States any subject invention throughout the 
world.368 
The simplest method of implementing the proposal would 
be for the NIH to utilize this reserved license to allow anyone 
receiving government funds to use, in their research, all 
patented inventions made with government funding.  The NIH 
could declare (either in a policy statement or possibly as a 
regulation) that it deems anyone funded by federal research 
dollars to be practicing the patented invention “on behalf of the 
United States” and therefore to be licensed to use the patent.  A 
provision implementing such a license would become a 
                                                          
public domain for use in developing open source software.  See Press Release, 
IBM, IBM Pledges 500 U.S. Patents to Open Source in Support of Innovation 




ress+Release&STATUS=publish; see also Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 
298-99 (discussing the SNP Consortium, in which several corporations and 
other institutions agreed to make public their databases of small nucleotide 
polymorphisms (SNPs, which are important tools that help researchers 
pinpoint the locations of disease and other genes on the chromosomes), rather 
than protecting them with patents or other intellectual property).  See 
generally Robert P. Merges, A New Dynamism in the Public Domain, 71 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 183 (2004) (discussing recent efforts of private parties to enrich 
the public domain, rather than appropriate knowledge via intellectual 
property). 
 368. 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(4) (2000 & Supp. II 2002). 
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standard part of any government funding contract.  Under the 
provision, the funding recipient would receive a license (in 
effect a sublicense of the government’s license) to use all 
government-funded discoveries, while the government would 
specifically reserve the right to license other government-
funded researchers to use any patents developed during the 
funding recipient’s research.369 
This method of implementation might, however, present 
certain difficulties.370  First, although to date there have been 
no judicial interpretations of the term “for or on behalf of the 
United States” in this statute,371 thus allowing the agencies 
some leeway, the existing definitions of the means of funding 
research may create problems with adopting this 
interpretation.  True contract work—which by definition is “to 
acquire . . . property or services for the direct benefit or use of 
the United States Government”372—can easily be viewed as “for 
or on behalf of the United States.”  Thus, work done pursuant 
to government contracts should already fall within the 
government’s reserved license.  However, the NIH and other 
agencies fund most research through grants, which by 
definition are used “to transfer a thing of value to the . . . 
recipient to carry out a public purpose of support or stimulation 
authorized by a law of the United States instead of acquiring . . 
                                                          
 369. Interestingly, in Madey v. Duke University, Duke asserted that it had 
such a license under the Bayh-Dole Act, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(4), to 
use Madey’s patented invention in its research projects.  Madey v. Duke 
University, 266 F. Supp. 2d 420, 425, 428-29 & n.3 (M.D.N.C. 2001), rev’d in 
part by 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002).  Duke argued that its research was 
“authorized by the Government, conducted for the Government, or funded by 
the Government” and therefore fell under the government’s reserved Bayh-
Dole license.  Id. at 425.  The District Court found that the experimental use 
exemption applied, so it did not reach this defense, although it did note the 
argument’s basic plausibility.  See id. at 428-29 & n.3.  The Federal Circuit 
found the record on this point insufficient and remanded the issue to the 
District Court.  Madey v. Duke University, 307 F.3d 1351, 1363-64 (Fed. Cir. 
2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 958 (2003).  On remand, the court rejected the 
defense as a matter of law, holding that it belonged to the government and 
could not be asserted by a private party.  Madey v. Duke University, 2006 WL 
267187 at *7-11 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 31, 2006).  However, the failure of this defense 
has very little direct relation to my proposal, which requires at the very least 
that any such license must be written into the grant, which was not the case 
in Madey. 
 370. See Rohrbaugh Presentation, supra note 356, at 137-40. 
 371. See id. at 139-40. 
 372. 31 U.S.C. § 6303(1) (2000). 
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. property or services for the direct benefit or use of the United 
States Government,”373 and thus are more of an assistance 
mechanism directed at the recipient.374  Declaring work under 
a grant to be “on behalf of the United States” is therefore 
something of a leap, and it would probably be an inappropriate 
extension of the reserved right.375 
Furthermore, declaring that research is “for or on behalf of 
the United States” has implications far beyond the simple issue 
of patent licenses.376  In general, such a declaration gives the 
government significant control over the funded project, far 
beyond that normally conveyed by a research grant.377  If a 
particular piece of research work is “for or on behalf of the 
United States,” then the agency will be looking for a specific 
type of result to fulfill a specific goal and so will want direct 
control over implementation, to ensure that it is getting that 
type of result.  Most grantees would be very reluctant to cede 
such control to the agency, as they value their independence 
and look askance at any attempt by the government to control 
the direction of the research.378  Furthermore, the agency 
probably would not want control anyway—when it needs or 
desires such a directed result, it uses a requirements contract 
rather than a grant.  In addition, the government might, by 
making such a declaration, open itself up to liability for patent 
                                                          
 373. Id. § 6304(1) (emphasis added). 
 374. See Rohrbaugh Presentation, supra note 356, at 139-40. 
 375. See NIH RESEARCH TOOLS REPORT, supra note 193, at app. D (“It is 
not clear whether NIH’s retained license . . . allows NIH to authorize use of 
subject inventions by other recipients of NIH grants.”).  The appendix also 
discusses the distinction between contracts and grants.  See id. 
 376. See Rohrbaugh Presentation, supra note 356, at 139-40 (“There are a 
lot of implications that are negative with respect to working on or behalf of the 
U.S. government in receiving grants.”).  In a subsequent interview, Dr. 
Rohrbaugh clarified that he was referring to the loss of control and loss of 
some rights that typically accompany working directly for the government.  
See Rohrbaugh Interview, supra note 279; see also NIH RESEARCH TOOLS 
REPORT, supra note 193, at app. D n.14 (“A broader interpretation of the 
retained license might also have implications for appropriations and grants 
law that neither the NIH nor other Federal agencies would welcome.”). 
 377. See 31 U.S.C. § 6304(2) (stating that a grant is used when “substantial 
involvement is not expected between the executive agency and the . . . 
recipient when carrying out the activity contemplated in the agreement”); 
Rohrbaugh Presentation, supra note 356, at 139-40. 
 378. See Rohrbaugh Presentation, supra note 356, at 139-40 (“But 
recipients of funding under grants, by and large, . . . are not acting on or 
behalf of the US government, and most of them don’t want to be considered as 
acting on or behalf of the US government.” (emphasis added)). 
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infringement by grantees.379  If the research is “for or on behalf 
of the United States,” then any infringement is also for the 
benefit of the United States, leading to potential liability for 
infringement damages.380  For similar reasons, this declaration 
might also have other tort liability consequences for the United 
Sates.381  The United States would understandably not want to 
assume these liabilities for every grant it issues.382 
One possible way to avoid these problems is for the 
Department of Commerce (which has responsibility for Bayh-
Dole Act implementation383) to either adopt or permit 
individual agencies to adopt a special definition of “on behalf of 
the United States.”384  Commerce could limit the definition to 
implementation of the Bayh-Dole Act and no other contexts, 
specifically excluding things like patent infringement and tort 
liability.385  The agencies could then implement the proposed 
                                                          
 379. See id. at 140 (“There is also increased liability and other issues that 
would pertain to the government, in which the government would not want 
these parties to be considered engaged in activities on behalf of the 
government.”).  In our interview, Dr. Rohrbaugh clarified that he was 
referring to liability for patent infringement being attributed to the United 
States.  See Rohrbaugh Interview, supra note 279. 
 380. Cf. 48 C.F.R. § 52.227-3 (2004) (providing clause to be used in 
contracts negotiated under the F.A.R. requiring contractors to indemnify the 
United States against liability for patent infringement, subject to certain 
exceptions); cf. also id. §§ 52.227-1, -2, -4 to -7 (providing related clauses); id. 
§ 28.203 (giving instructions on when to use the various clauses).  Note that 
the United States can be liable for damages for patent infringement, but 
injunctive relief is not available.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2000). 
 381. In our interview, Dr. Rohrbaugh also clarified that he was referring to 
liability for torts being attributed to the United States.  Rohrbaugh Interview, 
supra note 279.  The federal government waived its sovereign immunity 
against tort claims, subject to certain conditions, in the Federal Tort Claims 
Act, Pub. L. No. 79-601, Title IV, 60 Stat. 843 (1946) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
 382. Cf. 48 C.F.R. § 52.228-7 (providing clause to be used in contracts 
negotiated under the F.A.R. requiring contractors to maintain insurance 
against tort liability; United States will cover remaining uninsured tort 
damages, subject to certain exceptions); id. § 28.311 (giving instructions on 
when to use the clause). 
 383. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 202(b)(1), 207(b), 208 (2000 & Supp. II 2002). 
 384. Commerce has apparently to date declined to give the statute this 
interpretation.  See Rohrbaugh Presentation, supra note 356, at 139 (“There 
has been an issue . . . that the license applies and should apply to our 
recipients of all funding, including our grantees.  The government, the 
Department of Commerce, other agencies, have never taken that view in 
interpreting the words ‘for or on behalf of the US government’ . . . under Bayh-
Dole.”). 
 385. The term “on behalf of the United States” appears in other places in 
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license pursuant to this definition.386 
The options under this course raises the question of 
uniformity—that is, should the license policy be uniform 
throughout the government, or could it be enacted on an 
agency-by-agency basis?  Ideally, the policy should be uniform, 
so that government-funded researchers do not have to be aware 
of the policy of every agency that funds research leading to 
patents that they might infringe.  Part of the purpose of the 
license is to let researchers get on with the process of research, 
without worry over patent infringement of government-funded 
patents, and so seeing the magic words “this invention was 
made with Government support and . . . the Government has 
certain rights in the invention”387 in a patent should end the 
matter.  This purpose would be severely undermined if not all 
government-funded patents fell under the proposed license, and 
thus researchers had to take the further step of identifying the 
funding agency and then researching its licensing policies.  
                                                          
the U.S. Code, but the contexts are so different that they should not create 
problems with using a special definition for purposes of the Bayh-Dole Act.  
See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 403a (2000) (authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to 
accept, “on behalf of the United States,” title to the land that became 
Shenandoah and Great Smoky Mountains National Parks); 28 U.S.C. § 1404 
(2000) (discussing transfer of proceedings in rem brought “by or on behalf of 
the United States”).  Closer in context are some provisions in the tax code 
authorizing tax exemptions for work in certain industries done “for, or on 
behalf of, the United States,” but these appear to contemplate a typical 
government contractor relationship.  See, e.g., I.R.C. § 5851 (2000) (“The 
Secretary may relieve any person manufacturing firearms for, or on behalf of, 
the United States from compliance with any provision of this chapter [relating 
to special taxes on “Machine Guns, Destructive Devices, and Certain Other 
Firearms”] in the conduct of such business.”). 
 386. In his presentation, Dr. Rohrbaugh suggests that the NIH is already 
doing this on a limited basis: “[A]ll of our exclusive licenses have reserved the 
right for others to use the intellectual property, the research tool, to the extent 
there is one, for research purposes.”  Rohrbaugh Presentation, supra note 356, 
at 146.  However, he seems to be referring to patents owned by the NIH itself, 
arising out of its own intramural research.  The NIH has much wider latitude 
in placing terms in licenses for the patents it owns than it does in imposing 
conditions on patents that will be owned by its funding recipients under the 
provisions of the Bayh-Dole Act. 
 387. 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(6) (requiring this provision in all patents on 
inventions arising from federal funding).  But see Coe A. Bloomberg, Federal 
Funded Inventions and Bayh-Dole Act Compliance: Do You Really Own What 
You Think You Own?, 16 NO. 2 J. PROPRIETARY RTS. 1, 4 (2004) (discussing a 
GAO survey of compliance with the requirements of Bayh-Dole, including the 
notice requirement, for patents on inventions arising from government-funded 
research, which found that compliance with these requirements was “dismal”; 
also noting that the government did not seem to be doing anything to enforce 
the requirements). 
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Nevertheless, if Commerce is unwilling to go that far, 
implementation by individual agencies would still be preferable 
to the current situation, and such a partial implementation 
could serve as the starting point for full implementation in the 
future.  However, within each agency, the policy needs to be 
uniform, rather than addressing each contract individually, as 
the confusion noted above would be magnified dramatically if 
each patent required a separate inquiry.  Case-by-case 
determinations would also suffer from all of the drawbacks 
noted above for the proposal advanced by Professors Rai and 
Eisenberg. 
Another provision that might give the agencies the 
necessary power to implement the proposed change is found in 
the Act’s opening statement of policy and objectives.  This 
section identifies one of the goals of the Bayh-Dole Act as “to 
ensure that inventions made by nonprofit organizations and 
small business firms are used in a manner to promote free 
competition and enterprise.”388  However, in 2000, Congress 
passed an amendment that qualified this goal: “to ensure that 
inventions made by nonprofit organizations and small business 
firms are used in a manner to promote free competition and 
enterprise without unduly encumbering future research and 
discovery.”389  Commerce (or possibly an individual agency) 
could declare that the current system was “unduly 
encumbering future research and discovery”390 and that it 
needed to be fixed by freeing future government-funded 
researchers to use patented technology that was developed with 
government funds.  Although this section of the statute is 
really just a statement of purpose, Congress took the trouble to 
amend it in 2000, so the changed language should be given 
some practical effect.391  The proposed Bayh-Dole license 
                                                          
 388. 35 U.S.C. § 200. 
 389. Id. (emphasis added). 
 390. The agency would probably need to hold hearings and otherwise 
gather evidence to prove the point, but it should be able to do so adequately. 
 391. The history behind this amendment is rather obscure.  It was enacted 
as part of the Technology Transfer Commercialization Act of 2000, H.R. 209, 
which was concerned primarily with the circumstances under which federal 
agencies should grant exclusive licenses to technology it owned.  See H.R. REP. 
NO. 106-209, pt. 1, at 1 (1999).  The version of the bill passed out of committee 
on May 6, 1999, did not contain this particular amendment to § 200.  See id. at 
2-5; 145 CONG. REC. H2919 (daily ed. May 6, 1999) (report of Rep. 
Sensenbrenner).  The House of Representatives then took up the bill on May 
11, 1999, and the version introduced then did contain this amendment.  See 
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embodies the goal of the amended statutory language, and so 
might be enacted under its auspices. 
Alternatively, Congress could simply add a new subsection 
to the Bayh-Dole Act that requires (or at least specifically 
allows) the agencies to grant such licenses.  This is certainly 
the cleanest method, as it removes the possibility of disgruntled 
patentees challenging the action as beyond the power of the 
agencies.  It would also implement a desirable uniform policy 
across all funding agencies.  However, a mechanism that 
allowed the agency to make the change, rather than requiring 
congressional action, would be more expedient, as the agency is 
likely to be less resistant to this type of change, and indeed 
might even embrace it.392  The agency would also likely be able 
to move more quickly on the matter.393 
Whichever body institutes the change would have to pay 
close attention to timing issues.  Suddenly changing the rules 
of who can freely use patents raises the specter of unwelcome 
takings claims under the Fifth Amendment.394  A patent is 
generally considered a strong property right, and thus a 
government-imposed restriction on against whom it can be 
asserted would almost certainly be resisted by patentees as a 
taking of a property right without compensation.395 
The simplest way to address this concern would be to make 
the change prospective only.  This solution would then raise the 
question of what should be the relevant event for the 
prospective cutoff.  The most obvious event would be the patent 
application itself, applying the limitation only to applications 
                                                          
145 CONG. REC. H2941 (daily ed. May 11, 1999); see also 145 CONG. REC. 
S5041-42 (statement of Sen. Hatch) (documenting that the text of S. 999, the 
counterpart to H.R. 209, also contained the amendment).  The record is silent 
as to how (and why) the text of the bill changed during this time. 
 392. Cf. supra notes 277, 284-285 and accompanying text (discussing the 
scientists in charge of the NIH). 
 393. Cf. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 172, at 115 
(“Realistically, the likelihood that Congress will pass research-exception 
legislation in the absence of compelling circumstances is small.  Accordingly, 
we recommend consideration of administrative action.”). 
 394. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 395. Whether it would in fact be a taking raises some very interesting 
questions of takings law regarding what, exactly, has been taken and whether 
taking that causes the requisite level of harm to the property interest.  Indeed, 
these are questions that would arise in any proposal that attempts to limit the 
patent right, such as implementing an expanded experimental use right; 
however, they do not seem to be addressed by such proposals..  Further 
exposition of this issue is beyond the scope of this Article and is left for future 
development. 
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filed after the effective date of the implementing regulation (or 
legislation).  However, at this point, the researcher will have 
already conducted the research leading to such applications 
pursuant to an earlier funding agreement.  This earlier 
agreement will arguably have led the researcher to believe that 
any patent he or she obtained on the research would not 
contain such a limitation, and therefore the researcher would 
likely try to assert that this change in expectation was still a 
taking.396  To address this concern, the triggering event could 
be the approval of the grant application, with the exemption 
applying only to patents granted on inventions arising from 
research conducted pursuant to funding agreements made after 
the effective date of the implementing statute or regulation.  
On the other hand, given the language of §202(c)(4), an agency 
could certainly take the position that licensing “on behalf of the 
government” was part of the bargain when the patentee took 
title under the terms of the Bayh-Dole Act, and so the patentee 
has no grounds to complain—another advantage of using that 
provision rather than relying on congressional action. 
2. Terms of the License 
Another important consideration is the scope of the rights 
that the license should give to government-funded researchers 
(or, conversely, what limitations it should impose on patentees).  
The license should be limited to research activities, provide for 
certain limited sublicensing, require notification of the patentee 
where feasible, and address the issue of researchers giving 
away the patented invention to the public in a way that 
damages the economic position of the patentee. 
a. Limitation on Rights Licensed 
The most important feature of the license is that it needs to 
be strictly limited to the types of activities necessary to 
research and not extended to purely commercial activities. 
The Patent Act defines infringement thus: 
[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any 
patented invention, within the United States or imports into the 
United States any patented invention during the term of the patent 
therefor, infringes the patent.397 
                                                          
 396. Whether or not such an argument would be successful is well beyond 
the scope of this Article. 
 397. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000). 
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In general, the researcher should not need to offer to sell, 
sell, or import the patented invention to use it in research, so 
the license should not include these rights.398  The patentee 
should retain all these rights to commercialize the invention.399  
Only the rights to make or use the patented invention for 
research purposes on the funded research project should be 
included in the license.  This limitation would prevent 
researchers from using the research license to exploit the 
technology commercially.400 
However, this limitation may create problems in certain 
situations.  For example, a licensed researcher often will want 
to transfer particular research materials to another 
government-funded researcher who is also licensed.  For 
instance, the licensed researcher might place a patented gene 
into a new expression vector401 that makes it more useful (but 
still infringing).  Other licensed researchers may also wish to 
use the new vector/gene system.  Rather than trying to recreate 
the vector themselves, these latter researchers will commonly 
ask the first researcher to send them bacterial cells containing 
the new vector, which they can then propagate and use to 
obtain the expression vector as needed. 
Normally, such a transaction will not raise any problems.  
However, if the material is expensive to create or to ship, the 
first researcher might desire to recover costs.402  The 
introduction of money into the transfer arguably converts the 
transaction into a “sale,” which is not covered by the license.  
The license could address this issue in several ways.  It could 
specify that such recovery of costs is not a “sale” for purposes of 
                                                          
 398. As noted, patent rights are divisible, and so the proposed license may 
be constructed to exclude commercialization rights.  See SCHECHTER & 
THOMAS, supra note 117, at 4. 
 399. Or, more precisely, to prevent others from commercializing it.  The 
patent code makes clear that a patentee has only the right to exclude others 
from commercializing the invention, see 35 U.S.C. § 271; a patent gives the 
patentee no positive right to do anything.  In the present context, the 
distinction is of little practical importance—assuming there is no other 
limitation on the sale of the technology, excluding others leaves the patentee 
as the sole seller of the technology. 
 400. See Mueller, supra note 174, at 58 (making a similar distinction). 
 401. An expression vector is a DNA construct that allows a gene cloned into 
it to be expressed as protein in a particular expression system.  Such vectors 
are generally propagated in bacterial cells, allowing for easy creation of large 
quantities of the vector as needed. 
 402. This typically would not be the case for a simple DNA construct, but it 
might be true of, for example, a model organism such as a mouse or rabbit. 
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the license, or specifically grant the right to make this type of 
sale and no other.  Alternatively, the license could simply 
exclude the right to make such sales and require that the 
licensees get specific permission for each such transfer. 
b. Sublicensing 
The license will also need to address the issue of 
sublicensing.  The license should allow limited sublicensing 
when it is integral to advancing the research needs of the 
licensee, but not for commercialization.403  For example, the 
researcher should be allowed to sublicense an outside firm to 
custom manufacture a necessary piece of apparatus, but not to 
sell that apparatus to anyone else.  And similar to the 
reimbursement issue discussed above, the licensee should be 
allowed to reimburse the sublicensee for the costs of making 
the apparatus.  However, this right should be subject to an 
important limitation: A manufacturing subcontract should be 
allowed only if the patentee is not itself selling such a piece of 
apparatus; otherwise, the sublicense will have a direct adverse 
impact on the patentee.404  The sublicensing issue might also 
arise during clinical research, when the researcher requires 
subjects to perform some sort of infringing test or treatment on 
themselves as part of the research project.  The license 
agreement should cover such uses, and the patentee should not 
be able to sue the subjects directly for infringement.405 
c. Notice to the Patentee 
Another licensing issue is notification of the patentee.  The 
license could require the researcher to notify the patentee that 
he or she is using the patented method or device pursuant to 
the government license, so that the patentee can monitor 
                                                          
 403. Of course, the latter limitation will largely be built into the license—
since the researcher lacks the right to sell, it cannot sublicense that right to 
another party. 
 404. This limitation addresses the potential problems the proposed license 
might create for kits and apparatus in biotechnology research discussed above. 
 405. But see Kimberly Blanton, Corporate Takeover: Exploiting the U.S. 
Patent System, a Single Company Has Gained Control over Genetic Research 
and Testing for Breast Cancer. and Scientists, Doctors, and Patients Have to 
Play by Its Rules, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 24, 2002, § 2 (Magazine) (reporting on 
a commercial firm asserting that sharing the results of a clinical test with the 
patient makes the testing a commercial use, even if the use of the results for  
research use is not). 
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compliance with the license.406  However, while this 
requirement might make sense if the researcher knows that he 
or she is infringing, the researcher will often simply be 
unaware of the infringement.  Indeed, one of the key 
advantages of the proposed license is that researchers will not 
have to keep close track of all government-funded patents that 
they might be infringing.407  The license could require notice 
anytime the researcher is aware of an infringement, but have 
no consequences for failure to notify when the researcher is 
unaware of the infringement, coupled with no affirmative duty 
on the part of the researcher to seek out patents that might be 
infringed. 
d. Giving Away the Technology 
One final issue is the potential problem of researchers 
giving away the patented technology to others (typically the 
public), because they believe that the commercial products are 
too expensive.  For example, some researchers have complained 
that genetic tests for diseases are overpriced.408  A commonly 
cited example of this problem is the test for potentially 
dangerous mutants of the breast-cancer susceptibility genes 
BRCA1 and BRCA2.409  Myriad Genetics holds the patents on 
the tests and has been very aggressive about enforcing them.410  
Only a few laboratories approved by Myriad are allowed to 
perform the tests,411 and as a consequence the tests are very 
expensive.412  This situation has led to wide dissatisfaction in 
                                                          
 406. See Mueller, supra note 174, at 58-59 (suggesting a notice scheme for 
the experimental use exemption). 
 407. This point is closely related to the discussion of government-wide 
unity presented earlier.  See supra note 387 and accompanying text. 
 408. See, e.g., Anna Schissel, Jon F. Merz & Mildred K. Cho, Survey 
Confirms Fears About Licensing of Genetic Tests, 402 NATURE 118, 118 (1999) 
(criticizing exclusive licensing of genetic test patents as leading to their “being 
used to monopolize the testing services”). 
 409. See generally Bryn Williams-Jones, History of a Gene Patent: Tracing 
the Development and Application of Commercial BRCA Testing, 10 HEALTH 
L.J. 123 (2002) (providing the history of the gene, its testing, and the 
controversy surrounding the patents on the gene and testing). 
 410. Id. at 136 (“Myriad holds patents on the two BRCA genes in the U.S., 
Europe, [and] Canada . . . . Myriad has continued to aggressively enforce its 
patent rights in the U.S., and is also beginning to do so internationally, most 
recently in Canada and Europe.”). 
 411. Id. at 136 (“Commercial laboratories . . . were systematically 
threatened with litigation until Myriad became the sole commercial provider 
of BRCA testing in the U.S.”) 
 412. See id. at 133-34 (listing prices for various services); see also Jordan 
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the medical community, which feels that such important tests 
should be cheaper and more widely available.413  Their 
dissatisfaction is furthered by the fact that initial identification 
of the gene was funded, in part, by the NIH.414  The medical 
community has expressed similar dissatisfaction over a variety 
of patented tests for other disease genes.415 
Immunity from infringement liability would create a 
strong temptation for these disgruntled researchers to take 
direct action against the manufacturer by supplying the tests 
free of charge.416  Such activity should not be protected by the 
proposed license, as it is not part of furthering the research 
enterprise but is merely an attempt to undercut the patentee’s 
economic position, even though no direct “sale” is involved.  On 
the other hand, if the funded research does in fact require such 
tests, then the researcher should be able to conduct them 
without liability.417  The license terms should therefore clearly 
spell out what making and using is appropriate as research 
under the license and what is not. 
Myriad’s policies regarding research use of BRCA testing 
suggest one possible strategy.  Myriad has a special license 
                                                          
Paradise, European Opposition to Exclusive Control over Predictive Breast 
Cancer Testing and the Inherent Implications for U.S. Patent Law and Public 
Policy: A Case Study of the Myriad Genetics BRCA Patent Controversy, 59 
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 133, 149 (2004) (discussing costs of the BRCA tests); 
Edward Weck, Note, Exclusive Licensing of DNA Diagnostics: Is There a 
Negative Effect on Quantity and Quality of Healthcare Delivery that Compels 
NIH Rulemaking?, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1057, 1079-80 (2005) (same). 
 413. See Williams-Jones, supra note 409, at 137-38 (describing reactions 
against commercial testing); Blanton, supra note 405 (giving reactions of 
researchers and doctors to Myriad’s patent policies). 
 414. See Williams-Jones, supra note 409, at 131 (“[The BRCA1] research 
was supported in part by funding from the pharmaceutical company Eli Lilly, 
but also from government agencies such as the NIH which provided Skolnick 
[one of Myriad’s founders] with more than $5 million specifically to look for 
BRCA1.”). 
 415. See, e.g., Weck, supra note 412, at 1078-89 (describing several 
patented genetic tests and the reactions of professional medical organizations 
to them). 
 416. Indeed, the Canadian government feels so strongly on this point that 
it has refused to recognize the patents.  See Williams-Jones, supra note 409, at 
140-44.  European groups have been similarly forceful in opposing the 
European versions of the patents.  See id. at 138-40; Paradise, supra note 412, 
at 136-45. 
 417. Cf. Blanton, supra note 405 (describing research into the early stages 
of breast cancer that was halted because it required patient testing that would 
have infringed Myriad’s patents). 
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program for NIH research, allowing researchers to perform 
tests as long as they do not charge the patients for them; 
alternatively, Myriad will perform the testing for the 
researchers at a greatly reduced cost.418  A condition of the 
program is that the results not be given to the patient.  
According to Myriad, passing the results on to patients is the 
“very bright line” at which the testing crosses into the 
commercial realm and should be treated accordingly.419  
Alternatively, the license might define the right in terms of 
interference with the patentee’s economic position: If the 
researcher is simply replacing the patentee’s product, rather 
than using the invention to further his or her own research 
project, then the use is impermissible.420 
In practice, this type of giving away of the patented 
invention may not turn out to be a problem, as performing the 
tests does involve costs to the tester that must be paid 
somewhere, and finding funding to cover these costs is likely to 
be difficult.  Even if such funding is available, it is unlikely to 
come in the form of an NIH grant (since the hypothetical use is 
to undercut the patentee, not advance a research project), and 
so the license becomes irrelevant.  However, given the strong 
resentment that many in the research community have against 
diagnostic testing patents, the license terms should plan for the 
possibility. 
3. Participation 
Another key issue under the proposed license is deciding 
who gets to benefit from the government license, and, as a 
corollary, who must license the patents arising out of their 
research to others who are eligible for the license.  In many 
cases, funds from the government are insufficient to support 
the entire research project, and thus much research conducted 
with government funding is also supported by other funding 
sources.421  One possibility is to set a percentage cut-off, below 
                                                          
 418. See id. at 14, 27. 
 419. Id. at 20 (“[Dr. Gregory] Critchfield[, President of Myriad’s Laboratory 
Division,] explains, ‘If you give test results back to patients, it crosses over the 
line, and it’s no longer a simple research test.’ That, he says, ‘is really a very 
bright line.’”). 
 420. Intellectual property aficionados will note the analogy to the copyright 
fair use doctrine. 
 421. See, e.g., Williams-Jones, supra note 409, at 131 (stating that Myriad’s 
BRCA1 research was funded by both Eli Lilly and government agencies). 
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which the researcher is exempted from the license.422  These 
researchers would not be eligible to use patents covered by the 
proposed Bayh-Dole license, but they also would not have to 
subject any patents arising out of the research to it.  However, 
a better approach is to make the system “all-or-nothing.”  Any 
research project that receives any government funding is 
required to participate in the Bayh-Dole licensing scheme.  Any 
other system would become a bureaucratic headache, with the 
NIH and researchers constantly trying to figure out which side 
of the line the project is on and whether it participates in the 
proposed license scheme.423 
The potential impact of such broad participation is hard to 
evaluate.  Broad participation might create an incentive for 
researchers always to attempt to get at least a small amount of 
government funding in order to take advantage of the right to 
use the patents under the proposed license.  On the other hand, 
broad participation might cause some projects to steer clear of 
government funding to avoid subjecting any resulting patents 
to the proposed license.  An “all-or-nothing” system lets 
researchers make the decision for themselves and then stick to 
it safely and easily. 
D. RELATED PROPOSALS 
Other commentators have made related proposals for 
giving basic researchers increased access to patented products 
and methods.  One such proposal appears in the National 
Research Council’s recently completed comprehensive study of 
the future of the patent system, reported in a book entitled A 
                                                          
 422. See Michel, supra note 324, at 408 (“A research project may be funded 
by both federal and private sources.  Therefore it is necessary to set a 
minimum amount of government funding before the exception becomes 
applicable, perhaps 50%.”). 
 423. An example may help clarify the difficulty.  Assume that the cutoff is 
set at 20%.  A researcher receiving $50,000 from the NIH and $150,000 from 
an industrial partner would be eligible for the license (the NIH is providing 
25% of the funding).  Now, suppose the project is going well, and so the 
industrial partner provides another $100,000.  The NIH contribution is now 
only 17%, and so the researcher is no longer eligible for the license.  Next, 
however, the NIH might renew the grant, providing another $50,000.  Now the 
researcher is again eligible for the license (the NIH is providing 29% of the 
funding).  Assessing potential infringement liability in such a constantly 
shifting funding situation would be extremely difficult for the researcher to 
manage. 
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Patent System for the 21st Century.424  The report concludes 
with a chapter containing “Seven Recommendations for a 21st-
Century Patent System.”425  One of the seven recommendations 
is presented in a subchapter that proposes to “Shield Some 
Research Uses of Patent Inventions from Infringement 
Liability.”426  This subchapter first discusses the Federal 
Circuit’s Madey decision427 and its possible consequences for 
basic researchers.428  It then explores some possible 
mechanisms for shielding basic researchers from patent 
infringement liability, including provisions in foreign law and 
scholarly proposals.429  However, the report concludes that, for 
various reasons, none of the proposals are feasible.430 
As a solution, the report looks to an existing statute that in 
effect codifies eminent domain over patents.431  Under the 
statute, when the United States infringes a patent, the 
patentee’s only remedy is a suit in the Court of Federal Claims 
for money damages; injunctive relief is not available against 
the federal government.432  Furthermore, this limitation on 
liability extends to those entities doing work “for the 
Government and with the authorization or consent of the 
Government.”433  The report concludes that the government 
should explicitly extend this authorization and consent to all 
federally funded researchers.434  As a consequence, suits 
alleging infringement against these researchers would become 
suits against the United States, and would therefore be limited 
to money damages; research-threatening injunctions would not 
be available.435 
The report then makes the same correlation made above:436 
While distinguishing basic biotechnology research from applied 
biotechnology research is extremely difficult, receipt of federal 
                                                          
 424. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 172. 
 425. Id. at 81-129. 
 426. Id. at 108-17. 
 427. Madey v. Duke University, 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. 
denied, 539 U.S. 958 (2003). 
 428. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 172, at 108-10. 
 429. See id. at 111-15. 
 430. See id. 
 431. Id. at 115-17 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2000)). 
 432. See 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a). 
 433. Id. 
 434. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 172, at 115-16. 
 435. See id. at 116. 
 436. See supra note 291 and accompanying text. 
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funding can serve as a rough proxy indicating that the funded 
research is basic.437  Using government funding as a proxy lets 
the government extend its sovereign immunity to protect basic 
researchers from infringement liability.  The cost, of course, is 
that the government must pay for any infringement damages.  
The report suggests that the Court of Federal Claims has 
historically limited damages against the government in patent 
cases under the statute, and that therefore the number of cases 
(and the damages awarded) should be relatively small.438 
The report glosses over a small but key point in the 
statutory language.  The government has the power to give its 
“authorization or consent” only when the research is “for the 
Government.”439  As discussed above in Part III.C.1, declaring 
an activity to be “for the Government” can have significant 
legal consequences, not all of which are desirable.  The report 
does note that the authorization “should be carefully 
circumscribed to avoid conferring unrelated legal protections, 
for example, from tort liability.”440  However, it discusses 
neither how to achieve such a circumscription nor whether such 
limits on liability are even permissible under the statute.  It 
also fails to address the implications of governmental control 
contained in declaring the research to be “for the 
Government.”441 
In a footnote, the report notes that the related language 
appearing in the Bayh-Dole Act regarding the government’s 
retained license in the research it funds might be an 
alternative mechanism for implementing its research shield.442  
It concludes that this approach would be less suitable because 
it would be less broad, applying only to patents on technology 
developed with government funding, rather than to all 
patents.443  However, the report fails to note the corresponding 
advantage of using the provisions of the Bayh-Dole Act.  Under 
the statute, what the government receives in exchange for 
funding the research and allowing the funding recipient to 
                                                          
 437. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 172, at 116. 
 438. See id. 
 439. 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2000). 
 440. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 172, at 116. 
 441. See supra notes 370-382 and accompanying text (discussing the 
implications of declaring research to be “for or on behalf of the United States”). 
 442. See id. at 115 n.53. 
 443. See id. 
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patent it is a license right.444  By having the government extend 
that license to the researchers that it funds, rather than using 
its eminent domain powers, the proposed Bayh-Dole license 
and the report’s discarded suggestion would spare the 
government from having to defend any patent suits or pay any 
damages—they would all be subsumed under the license. 
Dr. Suzanne Michel also makes a related proposal.445  Dr. 
Michel first discusses the traditional common law experimental 
use exemption and problems with its implementation.446  Next, 
she considers previous proposals for a codified broader 
experimental use exemption and explains why none of them is 
appropriate.447  She then makes a two-part proposal.  The first 
part is “to grant [nonprofit] researchers [such as universities] 
the benefit of a clarified experimental use exception, which 
would exempt them from infringement when studying and 
improving a patented invention.  The exemption should extend 
only to research use and not to commercialization of a 
product.”448  The second part (which the author says is 
intimately entwined with the first, so that the two should only 
be implemented in tandem449) is to “appl[y a] broad 
experimental use exception to patents resulting from federally 
funded research so that the patent can be used without liability 
for infringement up to the point of commercialization.  The 
proposal exempts any researcher, whether for profit or not, 
from infringement when using a federally funded invention.”450 
                                                          
 444. See 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(4) (2000 & Supp. II 2002). 
 445. Michel, supra note 324. 
 446. See id. at 376-88. 
 447. See id. at 388-97. 
 448. Id. at 397-98. 
 449. See id. at 400. 
 450. Id.  Professor Eisenberg, without much analysis, also makes a 
proposal similar to Dr. Michel’s second part: 
For example, one might add a research exemption to Bayh-Dole that 
would protect researchers who later use patented research tools 
developed with government funds from liability.  Patent holders 
would still be able to enforce their rights against those who make, use 
or sell the inventions as commercial end products, including 
competitors who sell the invention to investigators for use as a 
research tool, but not against those who merely make and use the 
invention in their own research.  Obviously, such an exemption would 
limit the value of patent rights in any government-sponsored 
invention that is useful primarily or exclusively as a research tool, 
although the protection against competitors who would sell the 
product to researchers provides some measure of protection. 
Eisenberg, supra note 352, at 173. 
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Thus, Dr. Michel would implement a broader exemption 
than the proposed Bayh-Dole license: “Nonprofit” researchers 
can experiment on any patented invention,451 while anyone can 
do non-commercial research on patents arising from 
government-funded research.  While this broader exemption 
would encompass the proposed Bayh-Dole license and therefore 
have many of the same advantageous effects, its increased 
breadth might create new problems.  Because it subjects a 
much larger group of patents to free use by a much wider range 
of users, its impact on the patent incentive is likely to be much 
more significant, and it may lead to a corresponding reduction 
in corporate research and development.  Furthermore, the 
breadth of the exemption requires that Dr. Michel exclude 
research tools from its scope (otherwise, companies would have 
no incentive to create such tools, as they would be free to 
anyone).452  The inclusion of research tools created with 
government funding is an important advantage of the proposed 
Bayh-Dole license. 
The broader exemption also destroys the symmetry 
between government funding of the research leading to the 
patented research and government funding of the subsequent 
users of the technology, removing the equitable appeal of the 
proposed Bayh-Dole license and making it politically less 
palatable.  In particular, the expansion of the license to allow 
all “nonprofit” researchers to experiment on any patent will 
almost certainly be opposed by patentees who funded their own 
research and do not wish to see it “given away” to potential 
rivals.  When the government funded the inventions in the first 
place, however, subsequent licensees are in a much weaker 
position to make this argument.  Similarly, the destruction of 
the symmetry removes the analogy to a patent pool, as the 
licensing is no longer reciprocal—researchers may get access to 
the pool without contributing to it, and contributing to the pool 
does not guarantee access to it.  Thus, the advantages of 
creating a rough biotechnology patent pool are lost. 
Professor Mike Mireles suggests a change to the Bayh-Dole 
Act that is related to the proposed Bayh-Dole license in a 
different way.453  Professor Mireles first examines the patent 
                                                          
 451. Dr. Michel does exclude research tools from this exemption.  See 
Michel, supra note 324, at 398 n.151. 
 452. See id. 
 453. Mireles, supra note 173. 
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system as it applies to biotechnology research.454  He next turns 
to an examination of the anticommons problem, focusing on 
whether empirical evidence supports the theoretical 
construct.455  He concludes that, although the evidence does not 
directly support the existence of an anticommons, it also cannot 
rule it out.456  Professor Mireles then proposes a solution to 
help prevent or mitigate any anticommons that might arise.457  
After first proposing that the government commission a “Study 
of the Effect of Government Policy on Biotechnology 
Innovation” to resolve the issue of the existence of an 
anticommons,458 his solution then focuses on the use of 
industry-wide patent pools to facilitate the exchange of 
research tools, and government action to promote the formation 
of such pools.459  In particular, he first proposes that the 
government create a database of research tools so that those 
desirous of using the technology or forming a pool with it can 
find each other.460  Second, he proposes amending the 
government’s reserved license to patents obtained on 
government-funded inventions under the Bayh-Dole Act to 
make it transferable rather than non-transferable.461  However, 
the license would be transferable only in very limited 
circumstances.  Specifically, the government would have only 
the right to transfer the license to an industry-wide patent 
pool, and only when the patentee refused to put the patent into 
the pool itself and this refusal jeopardized the viability of the 
pool.462 
Although Professor Mireles’s proposal and the proposed 
Bayh-Dole license share a view of patent pools as a valuable 
tool in facilitating biotechnology research, the two proposals 
focus on different ways of achieving the desired result.  
Professor Mireles sees the government as merely assisting the 
formation of the pools; the formation of the pools themselves is 
left to industry.463  Under the proposed Bayh-Dole license, on 
                                                          
 454. See id. at 148-71. 
 455. See id. at 171-194.  Professor Mireles also explores past proposed 
solutions for dealing with the anticommons problem.  See id. at 194-224. 
 456. See id. at 192-94. 
 457. See id. at 225-34. 
 458. See id. at 225-30. 
 459. See id. at 230-31. 
 460. See id. at 231. 
 461. See id. at 231-33. 
 462. See id. at 233. 
 463. See id. at 230-34. 
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the other hand, the government creates a rough patent pool 
among recipients of government funding, with the hope that it 
might either be expanded into a true industry-wide patent pool 
or at least serve as the model for one.  However, the two 
proposals are not really incompatible and might both be useful 
tools for improving access to patented research tools. 
Finally, the proposal fits well with the NIH’s recently 
introduced policy for facilitating the dissemination of results 
from NIH-sponsored research.464  The new data access policy 
requests (but does not require) that all NIH-funded researchers 
provide the NIH with electronic copies of all articles that result 
from funded research and are published in peer-reviewed 
scientific journals.465  After a suitable embargo period, these 
electronic copies are then placed in an online archive accessible 
to the public.466  The copyright in the research papers remains 
with its owner (either the researcher or the publishing journal); 
the NIH archive merely facilitates access to the research 
paper.467  According to the NIH, the purpose of the policy is to 
increase the public’s access to the research results for which it 
paid.468  The proposed Bayh-Dole license is entirely consistent 
with this purpose: Both have the goal of increasing access to 
government-funded research (although the NIH data access 
policy is broader in that it encourages access to all the public, 
rather than just other government-funded researchers).  
Furthermore, both policies specifically limit this access to non-
commercial uses—in both cases, the right holder retains all 
commercial rights.  Thus, the proposed Bayh-Dole license 
                                                          
 464. See Policy on Enhancing Public Access to Archived Publications 
Resulting from NIH-Funded Research, 70 Fed. Reg. 6891, 6891 (Feb. 9, 2005) 
[hereinafter NIH Public Access Policy], available at 
http://publicaccess.nih.gov/Enhanced_Public_Access.pdf; Elias A. Zerhouni, 
NIH Public Access Policy, 306 SCIENCE 1895 (2004) (discussing the initial 
proposal for the policy). 
 465. See NIH Public Access Policy, supra note 464, at 6899.  Recent data 
indicates that the policy has been largely ignored, leading to calls for the data 
access policy to be made mandatory.  See Rick Weiss, Government Health 
Researchers Pressed to Share Data at No Charge, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 2006, 
at A17 (discussing Congressional concerns and proposed legislation to address 
this failing). 
 466. See NIH Public Access Policy, supra note 464, at 6900. 
 467. See id. at 6897. 
 468. See id. at 6892 (“The Policy is intended to: . . . make published results 
of NIH-funded research more readily accessible to the public, health care 
providers, educators, and scientists.”). 
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comports nicely with the current trend of NIH policies on 
access to research. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Bayh-Dole Act has, in many respects, succeeded in its 
goal of getting the results of government-funded research into 
the hands of industry so that its fruits can be enjoyed by the 
taxpayers who paid for its creation.  However, in some cases, 
that success has come at the cost of limiting or taxing future 
research, with no direct gain from such limits.  Thus, many 
commentators have proposed various changes to the Act that 
will help avoid these costs without destroying the benefits. 
One such proposal is made by Professors Arti Rai and 
Rebecca Eisenberg, who argue for a scheme under which the 
NIH (or, presumably, any funding agency) reviews each 
research funding agreement, predicts what invention or 
inventions might arise from it, and then decides whether any 
such inventions would be better utilized if they are covered by 
patent rights (giving private industry an incentive to develop 
them) or left in the public domain (so that all who desire have 
free access to technology that requires little or no further 
development).  Depending on this assessment, the final funding 
agreement is then drafted to allow or forbid the funding 
recipient to seek patents on any resulting inventions.  This 
proposal suffers from some serious drawbacks in 
implementation.  In particular, the NIH does not have the 
expertise, resources, or appropriate personnel to perform such a 
task, and it is likely to succumb to a variety of biases in trying.  
More important, however, is the difficulty that any analyst 
would have in attempting to see into the future and make the 
necessary ex ante determinations as to which path is 
preferable.  Thus, the proposed reform is likely to fail in 
practice. 
Instead, this Article proposes an alternative reform: Allow 
all researchers whose work is funded by federal funds to have a 
limited, royalty-free license to make or use, for research 
purposes on the funded project, any patent for which the 
underlying invention was developed with federal funds.  The 
license should be strictly limited to research activities and 
should not extend to the right to sell or otherwise 
commercialize the patented invention; the patentee should 
retain all rights to commercialize the invention.  Under this 
proposed license, government funding serves as a proxy for 
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basic researchers, who need access to fundamental research 
that has broad application.  This proposal should provide broad 
access to technology that was patented under the Bayh-Dole 
Act without significantly undermining patent incentives.  
Furthermore, it has the advantage of being simple to 
implement.  It also serves to implement a limited experimental 
use exemption, and it could also serve as a rough patent pool 
that can pave the way to a future true patent pool for the 
biotechnology industry.  Thus, the proposed Bayh-Dole license 
has many advantages and can help facilitate access to basic 
technology in the biotechnology field. 
 
